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ABSTRACT 
 
You Don’t Have to Go Home, But You Can’t Stay Here:  
The Impact of a Camp-Centric International Refugee Regime on Urban Refugees 
by 
Ainslie Avery 
(under the supervision of Prof. Shaden Khallaf) 
 
The American University in Cairo 
The insistence of states on confinement to camps, which developed into near-orthodoxy in the 
late twentieth century, has emerged alongside increasing refugee urbanization. I argue that the 
concept of “refugee” and state policy responses to refugeehood interact in a cyclical and self-
perpetuating manner. The concept of refugee comes to act as a master category, or definitional 
term that draws clear, immovable borders around a particular discursive space; and in doing so 
ignores both people and places which do not adhere to its standards. The international 
community maintains a “camp bias” in refugee response policy, while urban refugees fall 
through the cracks of the international refugee regime and face significant service and protection 
gaps. This thesis poses the question, “What are the impacts of Agier’s conception of the refugee 
master category, translated into camp-centric refugee policy, on urban refugees?” I argue that 
the international refugee regime bases policy-making on a refugee master category that strives to 
embed the characteristics of collectivity, exceptionality, and temporality into popular concepts of 
refugeehood, while those refugees who do not conform to these characteristics, namely urban 
refugees, are excluded from assistance and face significant structural protection gaps. Based 
primarily on extensive literature reviews and case studies of Kenya, Egypt, and Lebanon, this 
thesis begins by discussing the urbanization of refugeehood and by defining the refugee master 
category in contrast to the realities of this urbanization. This thesis then describes the emergence 
of the camp-centric refugee response policy regime, using the development of Kenya’s camp-
confinement policies as a case study. The challenge posed by urban refugees to the refugee 
master category is discussed, followed by an evaluation of the protection gaps facing urban 
refugees that result from both a refugee master category and refugee policy regime that turns a 
blind eye to the experiences of urban refugees. I conclude that both camp-centric refugee policies 
such as camp confinement and persistent protection gaps facing urban refugees effectively 
condition refugee behaviour in conformity with the dominant refugee master category, regardless 
of its inability to accurately describe contemporary displacement experiences, because the 
refugee master categories allow states to justify refugee policies that seek not the best interests of 
refugees, but the best interests of states through the externalization, marginalization, and 
exclusion of refugees.   
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INTRODUCTION  
 
In describing the isolation and marginalization of refugee camps, French anthropologist 
Michel Agier observes that,” [n]othing can ever be totally achieved in such contexts, the 
incompleteness of the integration process is cosubstantial to [refugees], quarantine being 
their very horizon.”1 It is little wonder, then, that a growing number of refugees – 
approximately one-third of the world’s refugees, according to UNHCR2 – are fleeing not 
once, but twice, or more: first, from persecution and violence, and second, from refugee 
camps that deprive them of their livelihoods, their dignity, and their humanity. The 
insistence of states on confinement to camps, which developed into near-orthodoxy in the 
latter twentieth century, has emerged alongside increasing refugee urbanization. Camp 
confinement has become a common practice in the developing world, which hosts the 
vast majority of refugees. Thus, policy-makers tend to focus on camps rather than 
refugees in urban settings. Developed countries also have a blind spot in addressing the 
specific needs and challenges facing urban refugees within their jurisdiction. The camp-
bias may have been a logical policy trend initially, as camps were viewed as one of the 
few means to deal with significant numbers of refugees. The persistence of camp-biased 
policies in light of growing urbanization among refugees is problematic. Why does this 
“camp-bias” persist, in light of trends toward urbanization among refugees, and what are 
the impacts of this bias on urban refugees?  
 I argue that the concept of “refugee” and state policy responses to refugeehood 
interact in a cyclical and self-perpetuating manner. The concept of refugee comes to act 
as a master category, or definitional term that draws clear, immovable borders around a 
particular discursive space; and in doing so ignores both people and places which do not 
adhere to its standards. States – with the complicity of international organizations – use 
the international refugee regime to advance a particular conceptualization of who is and 
who is not a refugee. The international refugee regime thus functions for the benefit of 
states, rather than for refugees. Far from being grounded in objective reality, this 
conceptualization serves the objectives of dominant states that seek to perpetuate the 
                                                          
1
 Michel Agier, On the Margins of the World: The Refugee Experience Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2008), 40. 
2
 UNHCR, “Urban Refugees,” UNHCR, www.unhcr.org/pages/4b0e4cba6.html (accessed October 2012). 
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externalization and marginalization of refugees through, among other things, camp-
centric refugee policies. Camps have become an essential element of refugeehood. As the 
international community maintains this “camp bias”, urban refugees fall through the 
cracks of the international refugee regime and face significant service and protection 
gaps.  
This thesis therefore poses the question, “What are the impacts of Agier’s 
conception of the refugee master category, translated into camp-centric refugee policy, 
on urban refugees?” In Chapter 1, I will describe the conceptual framework through 
which the refugee master category will be addressed, while in Chapter 2, the refugee 
master category is defined. In Chapter 3, drawing on a case study of Kenya’s camp 
confinement policies, I will outline the evolution of the refugee master category and link 
its development to the emergency of a camp-centric refugee response regime. In Chapter 
4, I argue that urban refugees pose clear challenges to a refugee master category that is 
inextricably linked to refugee camps. In Chapter 5, I will demonstrate the impact of a 
camp-centric refugee master category and refugee policy regime on urban refugees, using 
case studies of urban refugees in Egypt and Lebanon. I argue that the international 
refugee regime bases policy-making on a refugee master category that strives to embed 
the characteristics of collectivity, exceptionality, and temporality into popular concepts of 
refugeehood, while those refugees who do not conform to these characteristics, namely 
urban refugees, are excluded from assistance and face significant structural protection 
gaps. 
 
Research Problem, Context, and Justification 
 
What is the purpose of investigating the conceptual framework that structures discussion 
of refugees? The way refugees are conceptualized intimately impacts how the wider 
community – particularly public opinion, non-governmental organizations and 
governments – respond to refugees. While this paper focuses primarily on spatial 
conceptualizations, discussions of dialectical conceptualizations are closely related. For 
example, although “refugee” is a legally defined term, its meaning in the public 
consciousness is much more fluid. The socio-cultural concept of “refugee” for those in 
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the developed world is manifold. In the public imagination, the term conjures images of 
the weak, vulnerable, poor, weary, gathering in camps set up on the fringes to contain 
their misery. But is this the reality for those who seek refuge from persecution? While 
their persecution is common, their refuge is not. Contrary to popular imagery or belief, 
refugees are not always poor, not always weak, and not always confined to the fringes. 
To believe so serves to disenfranchise individual refugees – to assign generalized 
characteristics to refugees negates their individual circumstances. The 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) guarantees each individual 
seeking refuge the benefit of individual consideration. For example, not every Somali 
faces clan-based persecution; not every woman from a Muslim country has a gender-
based claim. To believe so eliminates the uniqueness of each individual refugee case. 
Most significantly for the purposes of this paper, not all refugees are confined to 
refugee camps in peripheral locales. In fact, a growing proportion of refugees flee their 
homes – and, indeed, their lives in refugee camps – for urban areas. Karen Jacobsen notes 
that, despite government efforts to contain refugees to camps or other designated 
settlement areas, such policies are difficult to enforce. This lack of enforcement, 
combined with poor living conditions in camps, have led to significant numbers of 
refugees moving to urban areas or otherwise self-settling. Refugees seeking shelter in 
urban areas may flee directly to cities, or may arrive from camps settings; in some 
instances, refugees may have a choice between the two options, while in others a choice 
may not be available. Regardless of how or why refugees seek shelter in urban settings, 
they often face significant service and protection gaps on arrival.  
Once in urban settings, Jacobsen argues that refugees exist at the nexus of two 
populations: the urban poor and foreign-born migrants. Urban refugees face numerous 
challenges. For example, they may lack access to social networks or have depleted their 
resources during their flight, while being more likely to have witnessed or experienced 
violence, leading to additional physical and/or mental health issues
3
. Yet these refugees 
are rarely dealt with in national refugee policies, particularly in the developing world, 
                                                          
3
 Karen Jacobsen, “Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Urban Areas: A Livelihoods Perspective”, Journal of 
Refugee Studies 19 (2006): 276. 
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where the majority of refugees reside. Instead, national policies consistently emphasize 
refugees in camp settings, and urban refugees are thus often dramatically underserved. 
UNHCR estimates that approximately one-third of the world’s 10.5 million 
refugees live in urban settings
4
. Urbanization among refugee populations, like 
urbanization among the general population, has increased dramatically in the latter half of 
the twentieth century. For the first forty-five years of its existence, UNHCR had no clear 
policy on urban refugees, suggesting that no distinction was made between refugees on 
the basis of where they sought asylum. During this period, the majority of refugees 
seeking asylum originated from Eastern Europe, and it was largely assumed that these 
refugees would settle in urban areas. Distinctions between urban and camp refugees did 
not emerge until the end of the Cold War, when the changing characteristics of refugees 
and evolving strategic interests of states led to the development of the current non-entrée 
regime and to efforts to contain refugees to camps.  
Despite the efforts of states, directly and indirectly through UNHCR, to contain 
refugees in camps, significant numbers continue to seek refuge in urban areas. Unlike 
camps, urban areas offer opportunities for employment and financial independence, as 
well as freedom from the Foucauldian observation and control of camp officials. Some 
refugees believe cities also offer greater access to medical services, educational 
opportunities for children, humanitarian aid, or even resettlement. Perhaps most 
significantly, given the challenges posed to the dominant myth that refugees want to 
return home
5
, seeking refuge in urban areas represents for many the opportunity to leave 
behind the trauma of their flight and build a new life. In many ways, camps seek to 
perpetuate the temporality of refugeehood. Agier describes those in camps as, “people 
waiting apart from society”6. But a growing number of refugees are no longer content to 
wait, despite the efforts of governments to confine them to these “out-places”7. 
It is within this context that this paper questions the perpetuation of camp-centric 
refugee policies. While numerous previous studies have examined protection and 
                                                          
4
 UNHCR, “Urban Refugees.” 
5
 B.S. Chimni, “From Resettlement to Voluntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of Durable 
Solutions to Refugee Problems,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 23 (2005): 59. 
6
 Agier, On the Margins of Society, 40. 
7
 Michel Agier, Managing the Undesirables: Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2011), 17. 
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servicing gaps facing urban refugees – often the outcome of camp-centric refugee 
policies – few have questioned why such policies persist. It is no longer sufficient to 
simply investigate how these policies are failing. It is necessary to interrogate why they 
persist if they fail to achieve the purpose states and the international community attribute 
to them in the public sphere – refugee protection. It is hoped that by understanding why 
such policies persist – particularly vis a vis their relationship with the concept of 
“refugee” – it may be possible to de- and re-construct not only the flawed policies 
themselves, but the biased conceptualization on which they are built. I argue that, a 
flawed refugee concept is at the root of flawed refugee policies, leading to the exclusion 
of urban refugees from protection and assistance. To demonstrate this phenomenon, I will 
first define the refugee construct or “master category” in order to illustrate how this 
“master category” has led to the creation of a camp-centric refugee policy regime. I will 
then describe the challenge urban refugees pose to the refugee master category, as well as 
service and protection gaps urban refugees continue to face despite longstanding trends of 
urban refuge.  
 
Research Questions 
 
This thesis seeks to address the primary question, “What are the impacts of Agier’s 
conception of the refugee master category, translated into camp-centric refugee policy, 
on urban refugees?” In order to answer this primary question, a number of secondary 
questions will also be addressed: 
 What or who does the refugee master category include, and what or who does the 
refugee master category exclude? Is there a justification for inclusion or 
exclusion, or are they political strategies? 
 What policies have governments and policy-makers used to cultivate and sustain 
the camp-centric conceptualization of refugees? How have these policies evolved, 
how have they been justified, whose interests do they serve, and who benefits 
from their application? Who challenges this conceptualization, and how? 
 What are the effects of camp-centric policies on refugees in urban settings? Do 
those in urban settings face greater protection gaps or vulnerabilities? 
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I argue that the refugee master category privileges camp-based refugees, while 
excluding urban refugees, because a camp-centric concept of refugeehood allows states to 
justify policies that externalize, marginalize and exclude refugees. The camp-centric 
refugee concept is maintained by camp-based policies such as camp confinement, which 
have become predominant since the end of the Cold War. Urban refugees challenge the 
camp-centric refugee concept, but in doing so, are subject to service and protection gaps 
that, by disadvantaging urban refugees, work to condition their behaviour to conform 
with the camp-centric refugee concept.  
 
Objectives 
 
The primary objective of this investigation is to interrogate how the “refugee” master 
category structures and disciplines refugee policy, and to determine the impact of a 
“camp-bias” in both the refugee master category and refugee policy on refugees outside 
of camp settings. By conceptualizing of refugees in a particular way, certain types of 
refugees – such as urban refugees – are excluded; response policies based on such 
concepts neglect those who do not conform, leaving them under-protected and under-
served. This thesis seeks to highlight both the power relations inherent in developing and 
maintaining the refugee master category, and to illustrate the role of the refugee master 
category in structuring refugee policies. To achieve this, the thesis contrasts “camp-
biased” or camp-centric policies, such as those present in Kenya, with the growing trend 
toward urbanization among refugees. Trends toward urbanization in light of camp-centric 
policies are then problematized by highlighting protection gaps facing urban refugees, as 
illustrated by the cases of urban refugees in Cairo and Beirut. 
 
Key Terms and Definitions 
 
Throughout this thesis, several key terms will be used in describing characteristics of 
both the refugee “master category” – discussed further in Chapter 1 – and the 
international refugee policy regime, as well as their impacts on urban refugees. These 
terms are defined and described below. 
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Refugee and Refugeehood 
Although at particular points throughout this thesis, the legal definition of “refugee” as 
outlined in the Refugee Convention and Protocol are discussed, the term “refugee” is 
interpreted herein to describe the popular concept of who is and who is not a refugee. The 
popular concept of “refugee” is closely related to the refugee master category and is 
defined in greater detail in Chapters 1 and 2. The popular concept of “refugee”, rather 
than the legal definition of “refugee”, is used because this thesis describes how refugees 
are viewed in terms of their location in the social context of both states and the 
international community. This location is inextricably linked to how refugees are viewed 
by governments, policies, and the general public, and has a significant impact on the 
development of refugee policies at both the national and international level. 
Closely related, the term “refugeehood” is used to describe the state of being a 
refugee. Like the term “refugee”, “refugeehood” is used in relation to the popular 
construction of what it means to be a refugee. “Refugeehood” is the condition upon 
which the socially- and politically-defined characteristics of being a refugee are 
projected; one enters into “refugeehood” after first being displaced and becoming a 
“refugee”. “Refugehood” is therefore related to one’s experiences once they have already 
been displaced, rather than to the conditions that caused their displacement, and describes 
their characteristics during the post-displacement period.  
 
Camp-Centric/Camp-Biased Policies 
The “camp-centricity” or “camp-bias” of the international refugee policy regime 
describes the reliance of states, the international community, and international 
organizations on refugee camps as the primary response mechanism to refugee-producing 
situations. Though this reliance was originally grounded in operational expediency, 
ongoing urbanization among refugees highlights both the divide between the conceptual 
foundations of refugee policy and contemporary displacement experiences.  
This camp-bias is evident at the national and international level. At the national 
level, the camp-bias is manifested in policies such as camp confinement and restrictions 
on assistance to and protection of refugees in urban areas. Through these policies, 
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governments, the international community, and international organizations such as 
UNHCR establish refugee camps as the primary response mechanism for refugees. In 
addition, camp-centric policies divert response resources away from urban refugees, 
despite their numerical significance and equal need for assistance and protection. At the 
international level, the camp-bias appears in both the preference of international response 
agencies and states for camp-centric responses and in the unequal distribution of 
resources between camp-based and urban operations. Inequitable distribution of response 
resources lead to significant, long-term protection gaps for urban refugees, even in states 
where seeking refuge in camps is not an option.  
 
Protection Gaps 
The term “protection gaps” is used to describe areas in which refugees generally, and 
urban refugees in particular, are lacking in the services or assistance necessary to 
actualize their rights and entitlements under both international human rights law and 
international refugee law. Protection gaps refer not only to shortfalls in legal and physical 
protection, but also to obstacles that prevent refugees from achieving a sustainable 
livelihood and accessing social services that are unaddressed by states. In Chapter 5, 
protection gaps are further broken down into legal gaps, economic gaps, and social 
service gaps.  
 
Methodology 
 
Research for this paper will be conducted primarily through literature review and 
secondary research. Although literature review dealing directly with the conceptual 
foundations of refugee policy is lacking, numerous authors have dealt with related topics 
that contribute to the subject herein. Case studies will be incorporated to illustrate aspects 
of the argument. First, in Chapter 3, in describing the development and maintenance of 
camp-centric policies, the case of Kenya will be used to illustrate the national and 
international contexts within which camp confinement policies, in particular, emerged. 
This case study will help illustrate the role of camps in maintaining particular aspects of 
dominant refugee concepts – namely, temporality, exceptionality, and marginality – as 
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well as suggest who is the primary beneficiary of the international refugee regime. 
Second, in Chapter 5, following a discussion of how urban refugees challenge dominant 
refugee constructs, case studies of Egypt and Lebanon will be used to describe the 
protection gaps that result from an emphasis on camp refugees as “true” refugees. The 
purpose of these case studies is to highlight different aspects of a larger phenomenon: that 
the persistence of a camp-centric refugee concept ignores and disadvantages urban 
refugees. The Kenyan case study highlights the significance of camps, and camp-centric 
refugee policies, in the international refugee regime and in developing national and 
global refugee policy. The Egyptian and Lebanese case studies illustrate the outcome of 
such global policy trends for urban refugees – isolation, socio-economic exclusion, and 
impoverishment. Recognizing that these case studies are not directly comparable – nor 
are they intended to be so – each case study illustrates a portion of the paper’s overall 
argument. 
 
Limitations and Ethical Issues 
 
The majority of research conducted for this work will be secondary research, drawing on 
existing literature and case studies. While authors in various disciplines have approached 
topics related to conceptualizing refugees, few have dealt specifically with the topic at 
hand. As a result, there is a limited amount of pre-existing research at the conceptual 
level to draw upon. While this paper aims to fill this gap, the dearth of literature to date 
has proven challenging in developing research foundations and the conceptual 
framework. Despite these challenges, this research design is intentional, as the paper is 
concerned with macro-level, conceptual analysis, rather than micro-level analysis of 
individual experiences. This method also limits ethical concerns that would otherwise 
impact researchers in direct contact with individual refugees. Literature gaps on this topic 
are themselves revealing, and I hope to address these gaps by offering new insight into 
challenges facing urban refugees at a conceptual level.  
In researching this chapter, I had hoped to interview staff of non-governmental 
organizations in each city; in Cairo, staff at AMERA, Caritas, St. Andrew’s Refugee 
Services, Catholic Refugee Services, the Psycho-Social Training Institute of Cairo, and 
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Refuge Egypt, and in Beirut, staff at the Lebanese High Relief Commission, Caritas, 
AMEL Association, RESTART, Danish Refugee Council, Makhzoumi Foundation, 
Association Justice et Misericode. Interviewees were to be offered the option to conduct 
interviews via email or Skype, or, in Cairo, in person. Interviews were intended to discuss 
NGO relationships with UNHCR Regional Offices in Cairo and Beirut and with 
government officials, challenges in working with and facing urban refugees, and 
significant protection gaps impacting urban refugees. Unfortunately, the majority of 
organizations approached for research assistance were unresponsive, and as such I was 
unable to conduct the desired primary research. However, I was able to draw on personal 
experience obtained while working with urban refugees in Cairo during an internship 
from August 2012 to May 2013. Given this experience, as well as the significant number 
of studies conducted on urban refugees, particularly in Cairo, I feel that, despite the 
absence of primary sources, protection gaps facing urban refugees as well-described. 
 
Summary 
 
This study questions why “camp-biased” refugee policies persist in the face of growing 
urbanization among refugees. It is argued that camp-biased policies serve to reinforce the 
dominant refugee concept or master category. It is states, rather than refugees, who 
benefit from this conceptualization. By challenging the refugee master category, urban 
refugees effectively challenge fundamental pillars of the international refugee regime. 
This challenge is met with neglect of their unique protection needs, ongoing 
marginalization, and enduring impoverishment.  
The case of urban refugees is by no means the only example of the effect of a 
reality that differs from a strategically valuable socio-political construct. However, this 
author contends that undertaking this study not only highlights the divide between 
concepts and reality, but that it offers a concrete starting point from which to bring the 
two more closely in line. The case of urban refugees also contributes to broader policy-
making discourse, exposing flaws in the refugee construct upon which policies are based. 
By questioning these concepts, and policies based on them, it may be possible to adjust 
11 
 
refugee policies and responses to displacement in order to offer better protection and 
assistance to urban refugees. This paper therefore aims to critique the very root of refugee 
policy and add to policy discourse an understanding of how the conceptual basis of 
refugee policy dramatically impacts the provision of protection and response to urban 
refugees. 
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Chapter 1: URBANIZATION OF REFUGEEHOOD 
 
Urbanization is not a trend confined solely to refugees. Over half of the world’s 
population currently resides in urban areas, and it has been estimated that, by 2030, 
approximately five billion people will live in urban settings
8
. Throughout this period, 
approximately ninety-five percent of urban growth will likely occur in the developing 
world
9
. Nor is urbanization a new trend among displaced persons. In earlier decades 
government leaders and international organizations largely assumed that refugees would 
settle in urban areas – and a large portion did. This assumption persisted until the mid- to 
late 1980s, when refugee camps emerged as the preferred choice for responding to 
refugee situations, particularly in Africa and Asia. Camps have come to dominate the 
international refugee regime to the extent that some scholars have characterized them as a 
fourth durable solution, despite their purportedly temporary nature. Camp-based response 
policies are now so fundamental to the refugee management  that many  question whether 
UNHCR should provide long-term assistance to urban refugees, despite the fact that 
neither the Refugee Convention and Protocol nor UNHCR’s mandate distinguish between 
the rights and services to which refugees residing in different areas are entitled
10
. The 
reversal of attitudes to camp-based refugee management, including characterising 
refugees as potential criminal or politically de-stabilizing influences is examined in a case 
study of Kenya in Chapter 3.  
 Despite increasingly camp-centric response policies, refugees have continued to 
settle in urban areas. Their ongoing desire to do so challenges and subverts a notion of 
refugeehood that is inextricably linked to camps. Currently, UNHCR estimates that 
approximately one-third of all refugees live in urban areas, a portion that has remained 
relatively stable over the past five years
11
. In contrast, approximately twelve percent of 
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refugees live in camps, while the remainder are unaccounted for
12
. The statistics 
describing urban refugees are likely to be underestimated as one of the primary reasons 
many seek refuge in urban areas is anonymity and a desire to minimize contact with 
authorities
13. Since the early 2000s, the proportion of UNHCR’s persons of concern 
living in urban areas has increased dramatically. In 1996, approximately one percent of 
persons of concern lived in urban areas; by 2005, this proportion increased to eighteen 
percent, and by 2007 to twenty-seven percent
14
. This suggests that, despite the assistance 
available in refugee camps as they have developed through the 1980s and early 1990s, 
large numbers of refugees believe that urban settings offer better livelihood and 
protection opportunities.  
At present policies that prioritize camp-based responses have a significant and 
overall negative impact on the ability of urban refugees to access services and protection. 
“Instead of considering mobility as an asset to enhance self-reliance, [camp-centric 
policies] focus on enhancing self-reliance to prevent mobility.”15 UNHCR’s urban 
refugee policy shift from “care and maintenance” to “self-reliance” results in fewer 
available services. Fewer officially sanctioned urban-based services from UNHCR are 
compounded by the  structural barriers imposed by many host states, which prevent 
refugees in urban areas from developing sustainable livelihoods. Taken together, urban 
refugees face significant challenges in securing protection and accessing services. These 
challenges are discussed further in Chapter 5, drawing on case studies of Egypt and 
Lebanon.  
Refugees chose to flee to urban areas for a variety of reasons. In some cases, a 
state may host no established refugee camps within its borders, forcing refugees to settle 
wherever they can. Once somewhat settled, one can imagine the lack of interest in 
moving to a camp if and when such a location is established.  Living conditions in camps 
also factor in the choices refugees make. Word of mouth descriptions of dismal sanitation 
and lack of shelter are impetuses to avoid more desperation. A similar result occurs once 
refugees have spent some time in a refugee camp – life outside the camp, despite its 
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dangers and restrictions, still seems a better alternative for many. Generally, scholars 
describe the motivations of refugees in seeking refuge in urban areas in terms of access to 
resources and services that are not available in either camp settings or rural areas. These 
resources can be broadly categorized as resources to increase power and anonymity or as 
resources to improve livelihoods.  
Many scholars suggest that one of the primary motivations behind settlement in 
urban areas is a desire to maintain power within and control over their living situation. 
Whereas camp settings strictly proscribe the activities and livelihood strategies available 
to refugees – partially by eliminating their individual agency and reconstituting them as 
passive recipients of aid – urban settlement offers greater opportunities for independence 
and choice among livelihood strategies. Urban settlement can thus be interpreted as a 
means of emphasizing individual refugee agency. Further, urban settlement may be 
viewed as an assertion of control over identity formation vis a vis the “refugee” label. As 
Roger Zetter suggests, despite the significant role of powerful institutions and actors in 
the labelling process, those subject to labelling are not without influence in defining the 
labels they are assigned
16
. By asserting independence in contrast to the passivity implied 
by the refugee label, urban refugees subvert contemporary understandings of who or what 
a refugee is. The challenge urban refugees pose to the refugee concept are discussed 
further in Chapter 4. 
One of the most well-described factors behind urban settlement is a desire among 
refugees to remain anonymous
17. Given that many refugees’ personal histories and 
displacement experiences include interactions with authorities ranging from malicious 
neglect to persecution, a desire for anonymity is not surprising. Harrell-Bond and Voutira 
suggest that, when residing in camps, refugees are subsumed under bureaucratic 
structures that embed the control of camp administrators over them
18
, while Agier 
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describes the evolution of camps into a form of humanitarian government that integrates 
control into humanitarian assistance
19
. In this context, refugees may and often do 
perceive attempts by camp administrators to control virtually every aspect of their lives – 
through the distribution of aid, management of movement, registration and research – as 
a threat to their independence. Seeking the anonymity of an urban area offers an 
alternative to such Foucauldian control. Polzer and Hammond characterise attempts at 
anonymity as a manifestation of James Scott’s “weapons of the weak” – a vulnerable 
population using the limited resources available to avoid Foucauldian “powers that be”20. 
Polzer and Hammond go on to suggest that anonymity, or invisibility, functions as a 
survival resource for urban refugees. Efforts to attain anonymity often include 
minimizing contact with bureaucratic authorities, including health or social service 
providers. Unfortunately, this exacerbates their vulnerability to discrimination and 
harassment, and importantly inhibits efforts to accurately estimate their numbers, 
understand their particular vulnerabilities, and develop policies that address their needs.  
Where a choice is available, refugees frequently choose urban settlement because 
urban settings offer greater access to livelihood and survival resources. Alexander Betts 
argues that the need to secure resources necessary for survival is as important to many 
refugees as flight from persecution
21
; similarly, once an individual or family chooses to 
flee, the choice of destination is partially determined by where survival resources can be 
obtained. These survival resources include employment, housing, education for children, 
and possible material assistance from humanitarian or social service organizations. By 
moving to urban areas, refugees may be able to access social networks or migrant 
enclaves
22
. In addition, refugees may believe that they can only seek international 
protection by approaching UN agencies in urban centres. The “pull factor” thesis has 
been advanced to describe how asylum-seeking behaviours are influenced by the 
availability of international aid programs, such as resettlement programs
23
. Paradoxically, 
many of the resources refugees seek by settling in urban areas are in reality either 
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unavailable or difficult to access. This is due, in part, to camp-biased refugee policies that 
dedicate resources to camps at the expense of urban refugees. The protection and service 
gaps that result are discussed further in Chapter 5. 
Finally, when faced with the prospect of settling in either a rural or urban area, 
refugees may choose to settle in a location similar to their home region for reasons 
relating to familiarity. For instance, refugees originating from an urban setting would 
naturally chose to settle in another urban area because their skills and experience are 
better suited to urban life. Familiarity with the circumstances in the location of refuge are 
balanced with the opportunities available for securing a sustainable livelihood. On the 
other hand, a refugee from a rural area may believe that settling in an urban area provides 
access to opportunities for education or training that can help them to develop a more 
diverse set of skills and thus maximize their potential for securing a higher standard of 
living in the future. The factors leading refugees to opt for urban settlement are diverse 
and vary between individuals, yet are highly persuasive for many when weighing asylum 
options.  
 
1.1 Conceptual Framework 
 
I contend that, in popular discourse, the concept of “refugee” acts as a type of master 
category. The concept of master categories was first discussed by C.W. Mills in the 1959 
manuscript, The Sociological Imagination. Mills suggested that it was impossible to 
investigate a particular subject or phenomenon – in his case, from a sociological 
perspective – without first establishing precisely who or what is included for study. As 
understood by Mills, master categories serve to structure discursive space, drawing 
borders around particular subjects in order to undertake meaningful analysis. Master 
categories operate much like labels, in that they define an inside/outside dichotomy that 
then serves as the basis of investigation – that is, master categories allow for the 
definition of a subject of analysis, while simultaneously defining the boundaries of the 
subject. Mills argued that establishing master categories was an imperative first step to 
undertaking research and to unpacking sociological phenomenon, to creating order out of 
17 
 
chaos by structuring the world of social interaction. Through master categories, complex 
issues can be illuminated and simplified. 
 However, it is this simplification that is also cause for concern, and as Saskia 
Sassen asserts, master categories can effectively obscure as much as they explain. For 
example, Sassen illustrates how construction of “the global” as a master category, with 
“its own power logics and exclusions”24, overlooks the role of national and subnational 
components that continue to structure globalizing processes. Sassen argues that it is 
therefore essential to “unsettle” such master categories on the understanding that they are 
not discreet, standalone beings. Instead, master categories are necessarily a product of 
social and political relations, and are produced by a power struggle for control over 
knowledge production. To understand a master category, and its effect on its subject, it is 
necessary to evaluate the dynamics within which it developed and operates. 
 I argue that “refugee” acts as a master category that structures both public 
discourse and government policy. Adopting Sassen’s critique, this thesis will investigate, 
first, the outward manifestation of the refugee master category and how this has 
structured government policy responses – particularly through camp confinement 
policies. As governments, through public policy toward refugees internally and through 
action toward refugees externally, embed a “camp bias” into the refugee concept that is 
they reify their physical externalization
25
. Once the confinement of refugees to camps in 
marginal areas – typically in the developing world – is accepted as a defining 
characteristic of refugeehood, the manipulation of the international refugee regime to 
achieve this end, as illustrated by Chimni
26
, becomes palatable to the public 
consciousness. In other words, the refugee master category is as much a child of politics 
and  socially constructed power relations, as it is of its humanitarian concern. 
Second, this thesis will explore the effect of the refugee master category on a 
specific subset of refugees who are excluded from both public and government 
conceptions of refugeehood: urban refugees. Reliance on “refugee” as a master category 
comes with a price – particularly for those falling outside of it. For example, it has been 
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argued that, in the legal sense, achievement of refugee status places one in a privileged 
category. This does not account for the hierarchies within the category of refugees
27
. The 
dissolution of “refugee” as a discreet category in public discourse through its conflation 
with mixed migration and its application to displacement not captured by the Refugee 
Convention and Protocol may further erode the status granted by legal recognition. The 
term “refugee” becomes at once heavy with connotation, yet devoid of meaning.  
In investigating the exclusion of urban refugees from public and policy 
conceptions of refugeehood, this thesis will discuss why the exclusion still exists. Urban 
refugees pose a significant challenge to the refugee master category, in that they call into 
question characteristics that are considered fundamental to refugeehood, such as 
temporality and separateness. The increasingly protracted nature of displacement further 
problematizes these characteristics. Protracted displacement renders characteristics of the 
refugee master category, particularly temporality and exceptionality, inapplicable to both 
urban and camp-based refugees, despite the efforts of states and the international refugee 
regime to advance these characteristics as fundamental to refugeehood. If these 
characteristics, accepted by many policy-makers as virtual truisms, are inaccurate, 
refugee policies structured on them are in danger of being ineffective. It is already 
evident that the outcome of sustaining a “camp biased” refugee policy is to leave the 
significant protection gaps facing urban refugees unaddressed. By examining in depth a 
particular aspect of the refugee concept, I hope to “unsettle” this master category and 
problematize public discourse and government policy – or, alternatively, sporadic, 
unguided government responses – founded upon it. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
 
As the primary research methodology is based on the review of existing case studies and 
relevant literature, a proposed bibliography outlining relevant source materials is 
attached. However, there is little written, to date, about how conceptualizing “refugees” 
in a particular way can exclude and disadvantage specific refugee populations. This may 
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be due, in part, to an understanding among academics that, as experts, their 
conceptualization of refugees is far broader than that adopted by the general public, 
policy-makers, or government leaders. However, given that the general public, policy-
makers, and government leaders each play a role in actualizing protections, services, and 
rights for refugees, it is important to consider the effect of a popular refugee concept that 
neglects certain populations or subgroups – such as urban refugees. Given this lack of 
concentrated literature, it is necessary to consolidate a variety of key works from various 
disciplines in order to describe the function, purpose, and outcome of conceptualizing 
refugees in a particular manner.  
 Building on Saskia Sassen’s critique of master categories, Tara Polzer, Laura 
Hammond, and Roger Zetter describe processes by which governments and international 
institutions manage the refugee master category. Zetter, in discussing the process of 
labelling refugees, effectively charts the application and function of the refugee master 
category to the international institutional refugee regime. Labels, Zetter notes, “are the 
tangible representation of policies and programmes, in which labels are not only formed 
but are then also transformed by bureaucratic processes which institutionalize and 
differentiate categories of eligibility and entitlements… labels develop their own 
rationale and legitimacy and become a convenient and accepted shorthand”28 – seeking, 
much like master categories, to simplify and explain their subjects to permit an 
institutional response. Zetter goes on to argue that, as changing migration patterns and 
shifting causality make it increasingly difficult to maintain the “convenient images” of 
refugees upon which institutional responses are based, the effectiveness of the refugee 
label is fracturing. Like B.S. Chimni, Zetter argues that dominant states are not only the 
key actors in (re)defining the refugee label, these states use the redefinition process to 
serve their interests. If, as Zetter notes, refugee status remains “the only systematic and 
relatively accessible route for large-scale, globalized migration,”29 these states have a 
vested interest in closely managing the distribution of the refugee label. The result is that, 
“the concept of labelling reveals how seemingly essential bureaucratic practices to 
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manage the influx of refugees, and thus manage an image, in fact produces highly 
discriminatory labels designed to mediate the interests of the state.”30 
 By encouraging fracturing of the refugee label, governments effectively create 
categories of less preferential refugee protection. For example, refugees in urban settings 
are more closely associated with economic migrants, and it is often assumed that the 
ability to make the journey to an urban area implies that urban refugees can take care of 
themselves, rendering them less deserving of protection
31
. At the same time, through a 
“draconian mix of deterrent measures and in-country policies and regulations”32 – such as 
camp confinement policies – states seek to manage claims to refugee status, thus 
shrinking the available protection space. However, Zetter argues that the transformation 
or fracturing of labels is not a one-way process, and that refugees are not always 
“dependent victims of larger institutional powers outside their control.”33 Rather, 
refugees have a degree of agency in choosing to adopt or oppose the characteristics 
imposed by labels. For example, by claiming status in opposition to the restrictions 
defined by states, urban refugees subvert the institutional labels imposed on them – 
making them a significant threat to both the state’s ability to manage the refugee master 
category, and to the legitimacy of its attempts to do so.  
 In a similar vein, Polzer and Hammond argue that, “by seeing, describing and 
categorizing social reality, we also make people and processes invisible.”34 Applying 
concepts of visibility and invisibility to “self-settled” refugees, Polzer and Hammond 
discuss how both governments and UNHCR seek to manage the visibility of refugee 
subsets to serve institutional interests. For example, by managing the (in)visibility of its 
subjects, governments and agencies can restrict the scope of their obligations to provide 
protection or assistance
35
. Further, Polzer and Hammond note that academia, by seeking 
“policy-relevance”36 in analysis and by adhering to institutionally defined categories, can 
be complicit in reproducing invisibility; for instance, “self-settled” refugees in the global 
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south are less studied than their counterparts in camps, while urban refugees were 
“almost entirely invisible to both practitioners and academics”37 until around 2001.  
 Invisibility, they contend, is the outcome of relationships between those with 
power and those without: “invisibility is therefore fundamentally relational; its impacts 
depend on the power relations and interests connecting those who see and those who are 
to be seen (or not).”38 Keeping people and processes invisible requires power, but 
institutions that have such power can impose visibility or invisibility – through the 
application of categories and labels – against the will of their subjects. Like Zetter, Polzer 
and Hammond suggest that the subjects of labelling and categorization play a role in 
determining their own (in)visibility – albeit in a different way. While Zetter emphasizes 
the ability of the subjects of labelling to challenge both the labels themselves and the 
legitimacy of those imposing labels, Polzer and Hammond suggest that invisibility can be 
used to the advantage of the invisible – that, in fact, refugees may chose to remain 
invisible in order to avoid regulation or intervention by authorities. Drawing on James 
Scott’s “weapons of the weak”, which describes ways that disempowered citizens work 
to remain invisible to Foucauldian “powers that be”39, the authors draw parallels to 
survival strategies adopted by urban refugees that reinforce their invisibility. For 
example, by avoiding contact with institutions and authorities, or obscuring or adopting 
new identities, urban refugees may seek greater freedom to pursue livelihoods, while 
simultaneously reifying their invisibility. Therefore, “neither visibility nor invisibility are 
inherently routes to empowerment – the impact depends on the relationship between 
actors and the functions which visibility plays.”40 
 Anita Fabos and Gaim Kibreab illustrate the translation of the labelling and 
categorization of refugees into government policy, both as an outcome of and a 
mechanism for maintaining public conceptions. Fabos and Kibreab view state policies of 
segregation, securitization, and criminalization – manifested, for example, in restrictions 
on freedom of movement – as being linked to a specific political objective of creating and 
perpetuating differences between insiders (citizens) and outsiders (refugees). In order to 
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prevent integration and prolong refugee status, which reinforces popular concepts of 
refugeehood, spatial segregation becomes a common tool. However, by removing spatial 
segregation, urban refugees challenge, among other characteristics, the division between 
insiders and outsiders, and the temporary basis of refugeehood –undermining popular 
concepts of “refugee” and the policies built upon them. 
 How do these concepts translate into refugee policies? B.S. Chimni tracks the 
evolution of the refugee regime, arguing that dominant Western states manipulate the 
refugee regime and refugee discourse to achieve political objectives – particularly spatial 
segregation, or “containment”41, of refugees and the maintenance of a “myth of 
difference”42. Chimni’s work locates refugee studies and the refugee regime within 
shifting twentieth century geopolitics, arguing that Western states’ policy toward 
refugees has moved from neglect to manipulation to containment
43
. Though the legal 
framework through which refugees are recognized and protected has not changed, the 
interpretation of the Refugee Convention and Protocol and operational policies have 
shifted toward advocacy of assistance and protection in regions of origin. By adopting 
this approach, Western governments are not necessarily seeking the best method for 
addressing refugee protection, but rather the best method of containing refugees to the 
developing world, far from their borders. Such practices reflect the self-interest that 
underlies not only the international refugee regime, but the international state system on a 
whole. 
In order to justify this spatial segregation, Western states have adopted and 
perpetuate a “myth of difference”. Chimni articulates this myth – a new way of 
conceptualizing refugees – as establishing “the nature and character of refugee flows in 
the Third World… as being radically different from refugee flows in Europe since the 
end of the First World War.”44 From this “myth of difference” came explanations that 
refugee flows resulted from internal conflict in post-colonial states a view of 
circumstances which simultaneously rejects external causality (i.e. invasion by a hostile 
government) and the resulting exilic basis of refugeehood (i.e. being forced to move to 
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avoid invading forces). If the West is not culpable for refugee situations, and protection 
can be provided in regions of origin, the West has no moral obligation to accommodate 
refugees in their territory. Chimni argues that such justifications have been increasingly 
invoked to permit the institutionalization of a non-entrée regime which seeks to contain 
refugees in the “empty” spaces of the developing world45. Further, Chimni finds UNHCR 
equally culpable in the production and dissemination of knowledge to reinforce the policy 
orientation of developed states.  
 To illustrate both the turn toward non-entrée and containment-focused policies, as 
well as UNHCR’s role in legitimating this shift, Chimni discusses trends in durable 
solutions. Of the three durable solutions available to refugees – repatriation, resettlement, 
and local integration – Chimni suggests that Western preferences have shifted in tandem 
with changing characteristics of refugee flows. Specifically, during the Cold War era, 
refugees, who originated primarily from behind the Iron Curtain, were perceived to be 
less of a socio-cultural intrusion, and to have significant geopolitical value. As such, 
resettlement to the West was pursued in the majority of cases. However, following the 
end of the Cold War, as more refugees arrived in the West from the global south, Western 
states increasingly pursued repatriation as the preferred solution. This shift was aided by 
UNHCR, which declared the 1990s to be the “decade of repatriation”46. The “myth of 
difference”, or the conceptualization of “refugee” in the public consciousness, plays a key 
role in legitimating such a policy shift. Chimni thus illustrates how dominant states both 
construct and perpetuate a particular image or master category on which to base and 
justify self-interested and politically motivated refugee policies. 
 Michel Agier expands further on the role of spatial segregation, in the form of 
refugee camps, in reinforcing particular aspects of refugeehood. Agier’s works on the 
role of camps in the development of humanitarian government, the transformation of 
camp spaces and the adaptation of refugees to camp settings provide relevant insights 
into camps as “spaces of exception”. In describing refugee camps and camp confinement 
policies, he illustrates how camps have come to define the refugee experience, and feed 
into a self-perpetuating cycle of both physical and conceptual separation from the 
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developed world. Agier makes several observations about the exceptionality of refugee 
camps. First, he highlights the role of camps in establishing and maintaining the physical 
separation of refugees from both their country of origin and from the local population. 
Drawing on Foucault, who argued that refugees were the first people to be “imprisoned 
outside”47, Agier argues that refugee camps – as well as the reception/detention centres 
that sprang up across Europe during the 2000s – represent an extension of strategies that 
seek to distance “the undesirables”48. Once in camps, refugees are further distinguished 
from other populations because they become the subjects of a parallel set of international 
guarantees of rights – despite their limited abilities to actualize these rights. In camps, 
rights and freedoms become resources whose distribution depends on the favour of those 
with administrative and operational authority. Camps thus become “zones of exceptional 
rights and power, where everything seems possible for those in control”49. Tellingly, 
Agier notes that the necessity of this separation is reified through the distribution of 
international aid: in both Kenya and Uganda – whose camp confinement policies are to 
be investigated in depth – aid to refugees is conditional, depending on their segregation in 
camps.  
 Agier’s observations on the separateness of camps is closely related to his 
description of the relegation of camp refugees to both the spatial and conceptual margins. 
Refugee camps, to Agier, represent a consolidation of the division between a “clean, 
healthy and visible world” (us) and “the world’s residual ‘remnants’, dark, diseased and 
invisible” (them)50. Their location in border spaces, at the physical margins of a state, 
distanced from the theoretically civilized core, is simply the spatial manifestation of the 
conceptual division. Their location is the product of both operational expediency – in that 
many camps are located in remote areas near borders where refugees cross – and 
deliberate political strategy. By locating camps on the margins, their status is clearly 
delineated from a host state’s society, creating  physical and conceptual barriers to 
integration and preserving their exceptionality.  
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 Finally, Agier’s observations on the role of camps in giving the illusion of a 
suspended state of emergency, despite their often protracted nature, completes the 
conceptual image of “refugee”. The association of refugeehood with states of emergency 
seeks to reinforce its temporary nature – an association which makes the confinement of 
significant numbers of people in marginal, extra-territorial space less morally 
reprehensible. As Agier suggests,  
[i]t is only the emergency situation and its exception character that 
justify these spaces, but at the same time these factors tend to 
reproduce themselves, to spread and establish themselves over the long 
term. This permanent precariousness is the first fact that strikes you 
when you arrive in a camp.
51
  
 
Further, the temporality of camps impacts perceptions of the ideal durable solution to 
refugee situations: “humanitarian sites are supposed to be precarious spaces, always 
provisional. The principle implies that the official end of a war is followed by departure 
of refugees…”52, presumably to their country of origin, rather than to either a 
neighbouring area or a distant third country. However, Agier goes on to suggest that 
camps, despite their supposed temporality, take on “a certain duration”53 and in many 
ways come to resemble cities in themselves.  
Agier’s observations lead to the ultimate conclusion that, above all, the primary 
function of refugee camps is control – as he writes, “there is no care without control”54. 
By controlling the physical separation and movement of refugees, it is possible to control 
public perceptions of refugeehood in a way that permits ongoing marginalization and 
externalization. Similarly, in illustrating the role of refugee camps in both informing 
definitions of “refugee”, Agier shows how camps support the self-perpetuating cycle of 
spatial and conceptual externalization of refugees. By nurturing a concept of “refugee” in 
the public consciousness that is defined by the camp experience, a camp-based response 
to refugee situations is constructed as the primary solution, which then further reinforces 
the place of refugees on the margins. Agier’s conclusions serve to reveal the strategy of 
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marginalization and externalization pursued by Western states in promoting and 
maintaining the existing concept of “refugee”. 
What is the outcome of incorporating such “camp-biased” concepts into refugee 
policy? While specific outcomes for refugees vary by location – as will be shown by 
reviewing protection gaps and servicing challenges facing urban refugees in Cairo and 
Beirut – Karen Jacobsen advocates the use of a livelihoods framework to approach urban 
refugee situations. In doing so, she illustrates the outcome of a camp bias in refugee 
policy and servicing. A livelihood framework considers both assets and strategies that are 
used to achieve a desired outcome, and the structural or institutional context that can 
constrain access to these assets and strategies
55
. Three components make up the 
livelihood framework: vulnerability context; assets and strategies; and outcomes
56
. In 
applying this framework to urban refugees, Jacobsen finds that, “[c]ompared with their 
co-nationals in camps, urban refugees often face greater protection risks, and receive less 
support in terms of shelter, health care, education, and other social services – and 
sometimes none at all.”57 Specific – and common – gaps Jacobsen identifies include the 
inability to secure housing; lack of identification and documentation; xenophobia and 
competition with locals for scarce resources; and access to credit and financial services
58
.  
 
1.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter describes the framework through which the concept of refugeehood is to be 
addressed. This chapter reviewed literature surrounding the construction of refugeehood, 
how understandings of refugeehood and policies toward refugees have evolved since the 
end of the Cold War, and the emergence of a camp-based refugee policy regime. The 
camp-based policy regime has come to inform how refugeehood is understood by 
governments, policy-makers, and the public, despite its exclusion of urban refugees from 
popular concepts of refugeehood. I argue that many of the challenges facing urban 
refugees are causally linked to a refugee master category that favours camp-based refugee 
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response policies and camp-settled refugees over urban refugees. The following chapters 
will illustrate how the conceptual exclusion of urban refugees leads to neglect of their 
needs for protection and assistance.  
  
28 
 
Chapter 2: “REFUGEE” AS “MASTER CATEGORY” 
  
This chapter describes the primary characteristics of refugees and key assumptions about 
refugeehood that shape the refugee “master category”. It is important to discuss the 
foundational assumptions of the refugee master category, in order to contrast these 
assumptions – and policies based on these assumptions – with the evolving realities of 
contemporary displacement. These assumptions relate to the belief that refugeehood is a 
collective condition, an exceptional state of being, and temporary. While these are not the 
sole characteristics of refugeehood, they play an important role in shaping how 
refugeehood is conceptualized in the public sphere and among policy-makers. The 
essential challenge with these assumptions is that they exclude a significant number of 
refugees who cannot conform to this image of the “ideal” refugee. When these 
assumptions become the foundation of refugee policy, despite their inaccuracies, the 
refugee master category loses its definitional functionality and becomes an exclusionary 
construct which deepens existing vulnerabilities among excluded populations.   
 As discussed, the contemporary refugee construct or master category shifted 
dramatically following the Cold War. When the binary international balance of power 
collapsed, dominant states saw less urgency in intervening in potentially refugee 
producing conflicts. Simultaneously refugees lost their significance as political tools who 
could be used to illustrate the flaws in opposing political and socio-economic ideologies. 
B.S. Chimni describes the resulting phenomenon as “new refugees,” constructed against a 
backdrop of a “myth of difference”59. These “new refugees” came to dominate refugee 
discourse in the public sphere, and to influence what policy-makers saw as appropriate 
responses to refugee situations, leading them to turn toward camp-based refugee response 
policies. This new trend differed dramatically from prior trends in refugee response 
policies, which favoured resettlement in dominant states based on assumptions that, if 
Cold War refugees returned to their countries of origin, they would face imprisonment or 
death. Seeking refuge during the Cold War was considered a fundamentally political act, 
with significantly negative impacts of the relationship between individuals and their 
states.  
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Since the end of the Cold War, seeking refuge has been effectively removed from 
its political context and is increasingly considered a mechanism of socio-economic and 
physical survival – without necessarily impacting the relationship between citizens and 
states over the long term. Because the bond between states and citizens, in theory, 
remains intact, it is assumed that refugees want to return to their country of origin as soon 
as possible, further embedding the exceptionality and temporality of asylum into popular 
concepts of refugeehood.  These assumptions are used to justify new trends in refugee 
response and management policies that externalize refugees from dominant, Western 
states, marginalize refugees within host states in the developing world, and exclude 
refugees from integrating into host societies
60
. These policies have evolved into a camp-
based refugee response regime, which includes both camp confinement policies and 
restrictions on the provision of assistance to refugees in urban areas – up to criminalizing 
urban settlement. Yet amidst mass influxes of “new refugees”, refugees continued to flee 
to urban areas in significant numbers, as they had since the birth of the international 
refugee regime. What changed was not the refugees themselves, but perceptions of what 
these refugees wanted and needed.  
 
2.1 Defining the Refugee Master Category 
 
As described by C.W. Mills, a “master category” is a definitional concept that permits 
academics, policy-makers, government representatives, and the public to describe and 
analyse a particular subject. A master category draws clear boundaries around a subject, 
simultaneously establishing both the scope and limitations of analysis and creating order 
within a world of chaotic and often overlapping social constructs. The “refugee” 
classification acts as a master category, and has significant connotations in the popular 
imagination. The term “refugee” is legally defined in the Refugee Convention and 
Protocol as a person who,  
… owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or 
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who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
 
However, in the public consciousness, refugeehood has evolved and taken on new 
meaning. It is in the realm of popular imagination that Roger Zetter’s fracturing of the 
refugee label occurs, as states and policy-makers increasingly use terms such as 
“genuine” or “legitimate” refugees in contrast to “bogus” or “illegal” refugees and 
asylum-seekers
61
, who are offered varying degrees of assistance and protection. As Zetter 
argues, “the proliferation of new labels designating different kinds of refugee claimants 
underpins a deliberately transformative process to create far less preferential categories of 
temporary protection.”62 Similarly, the application of the term “refugee” to emerging 
issues – such as environmental refugees or tax refugees – confuses both the legal 
underpinnings and humanitarian origins of the international refugee regime. The 
application of the refugee label, as opposed to the use of “refugee” in a legal context, 
illustrates how an essentially bureaucratic process is used to manage refugees, “and thus 
manage an image [in order to] produce highly discriminatory labels designed to mediate 
the interests of the state to control in-migration.”63 The fracturing of the refugee label, or 
the proliferation of additional labels within the refugee master category, functions to 
remove people from an international regime whose very existence illustrates their need 
for protection. It is in this realm that the refugee label becomes both heavy with 
connotation, but devoid of meaning.  
 However, despite this fracturing, certain assumptions about what it means to be a 
refugee remain embedded in the public consciousness. These assumptions are so firmly 
embedded in refugee discourse that they take on the appearance of fundamentality in 
structuring popular understandings of displacement and refugeehood – and, subsequently, 
in developing refugee response and management policies. These characteristics are 
described by Michel Agier and B.S. Chimni in contrast both to refugees and refugeehood 
in the Cold War era and to the refugee definition articulated in the Refugee Convention 
and Protocol. Agier’s and Chimni’s analyses prove helpful in articulating these 
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characteristics and in describing the characteristics – and boundaries – of the refugee 
“master category”. 
Chimni and Agier describe assumptions of the causes and sources of 
displacement. Both argue that since the Cold War, the causes of displacement have 
evolved from primarily political-ideological, individualized persecution to general 
violence and intra-state conflict – or what Zetter refers to as “muted conditions for 
refugeehood”64 – contributing to changing interpretations of the refugee label. Examples 
of such general violence and intra-state conflict may include ongoing civil conflict and 
persecution of minority clans in Somalia, or violence against Darfuri or Nuba Sudanese. 
Similarly, the countries in which refugee-producing circumstances occur have been 
increasingly geographically concentrated in the developing world – that is, Africa, Asia 
and Southeast Asia rather than Eastern Europe and Russia – leading to the racialization of 
refugeehood since the end of the Cold War. While Chimni describes shifting political 
understandings of refuge and refugeehood based on these changes as the “myth of 
difference”, Agier adopts a more politically-charged phrase – “the undesirables”65 – to 
describe “new refugees” based on the international community’s response to their 
displacement.  
 Descriptions of both the causes and sources of “new refugees’” displacement lend 
themselves to the assumption that flight, rather than affecting individuals and families, is 
increasingly a phenomenon that affects large numbers of people, up to and including 
entire communities, resulting in mass displacement. Generalized violence, or persecution 
targeting a particular community, clan, or ethnic group, has contributed to mass 
displacement throughout the developing world, particularly since the end of the Cold 
War. For example, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, internal conflict in Somalia led to 
the displacement of approximately 50,000 refugees into Kenya in 2009 alone – despite 
the Kenyan government closing its border with Somalia in 2007
66
. Such causality was 
formally recognized in the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing 
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU Convention). This causality has 
                                                          
64
 Ibid., 178. 
65
 Agier, Managing the Undesirables. 
66
 Avery Burns, “Feeling the Pinch: Kenya, Al-Shabaab, and East Africa’s Refugee Crisis,” Refuge 27 
(2010): 8. 
32 
 
become as significant in shaping public perceptions of refugeehood in contrast to the 
legal requirement for individualized persecution; in the public sphere, for example, 
refugees are frequently referred to as “huddled masses”67. Assumptions about the 
characteristics of refugees from the developing world also contribute to the association 
between refugeehood and mass displacement. For instance, belief in cultural traits – such 
as the nature of familial or communal ties – add to a belief that displacement from 
particular regions or ethno-cultural groups will necessarily be en mass. Therefore, the 
“myth of difference” described by both Chimni and Agier contribute to the belief that 
refugeehood is inherently a condition that affects people en masse.  
 Agier further discusses the role of exceptionality in defining the refugee master 
category. The exceptionality of refugeehood refers to the understanding that being a 
refugee is an abnormal condition, and implies that an unusual, often immediate response 
is required. As discussed, Agier argues that refugees, owing largely to misguided refugee 
policies, are held in protracted states of emergency in refugee camps. The camp model 
itself is based on emergency response principles intended to provide exceptional 
assistance to large numbers of individuals and families; similar response activities are 
undertaken in cases where significant numbers of people are displaced due to natural 
disasters. However, policies that intend to provide exceptional, emergency assistance is 
inadequate for sustaining refugees over an extended period of time. For example, food 
rations provided on an emergency basis often meet only minimum nutritional and caloric 
standards as it is assumed that, at some point, the emergency will end and those receiving 
assistance will resume sustaining themselves independently. Food rations are not a 
sustainable solution for refugees residing in camps for decades or more – particularly 
refugee children, who have greater nutritional requirements over the long term. Further, 
over the long term, funding for a particular camp often plateaus or decreases, as donor 
attention shifts to other priorities, making it difficult to provide even basic food, shelter, 
health care, and education as the duration of displacement increases. While an 
exceptional, emergency response to large-scale displacement may be justified from an 
operational perspective, maintaining such a response in light of the prevalence of long-
term, protracted displacement is ineffective and unsustainable.   
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Drawing on the example of refugee camps, Agier describes an emergency 
response which has become a normal state of being in order to justify the continued 
provision of humanitarian aid
68
. By emphasizing a shared sense of exceptionality, 
combined with effective imprisonment in marginalized camps – discussed further in the 
following chapter – Agier notes that a sense of abnormality develops around camps: “by 
fixing them and gathering them collectively, these other spaces turn their occupants into 
permanent deviants, abnormals who are kept at a distance.”69 From a legal standpoint, 
refugeehood is further understood as an exceptional condition that occurs only when 
states fail or are unable to protect their citizens from persecution; however, practically, 
the increasingly protracted nature of displacement has contributed to the effective 
normalization of refugeehood among displaced populations. Exceptionality is, indeed, a 
significant area of divergence between the legal foundations of refugeehood and the 
refugee master category on one hand, and the reality of contemporary displacement on 
the other. Exacerbated by policies that institutionalize states of emergency and 
abnormality, the belief that refugeehood is an exceptional condition has become both 
entrenched in public concepts of refuge and internalized by refugees themselves.  
 Finally, Agier discusses an insistence on the temporary nature of refugeehood; 
with reference to refugee camps, Agier notes, “the humanitarian sites are supposed to be 
precarious, always provisional. The principle implies that the official end of a war is 
followed by departure of refugees and the closure of the camp.”70 The temporality of 
refugeehood is closely related to the exceptionality of refugeehood, and refers to the 
belief that seeking refuge or being a refugee is a fundamentally temporary condition. Like 
exceptionality, the temporality of refugee status is implied in the refugee definition 
articulated by the Refugee Convention and Protocol, yet conflicts with the effective 
permanence of refugeehood in a growing number of cases. For example, in addition to 
the increasing incidence of protracted displacement, refugees face significant challenges 
accessing durable solutions other than voluntary repatriation – either local integration or 
resettlement. UNHCR primarily measures local integration by the ability of refugees to 
access citizenship through the naturalization process. However, given that most states 
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utilize either jus sanginis or jus solis – or a combination thereof – to grant citizenship, 
refugees face substantive obstacles to obtaining citizenship, and by extension, local 
integration. Many key host states, such as Egypt, refuse to recognize local integration as a 
solution for refugees, arguing instead that their role as a host state should be temporary, 
and matched by the availability of resettlement to third countries because they lack the 
resources to protect and assist refugees
71
. On the other hand, the extremely small 
numbers of resettlement spaces available globally – less than 100,000 spaces annually – 
make accessing resettlement challenging
72
. In combination with the increasing reliance of 
Western states on a non-entrée refugee policy regime, refugees have limited options for 
accessing durable solutions other than voluntary repatriation.  
Despite the preference of resettlement states for voluntary repatriation
73
, there are 
numerous cases in which voluntary repatriation is not a viable option. The permanence of 
refugeehood can be compounded by the unwillingness of refugees to return to their 
country of origin, and by their inability to return home due to conditions in the country of 
origin. Chimni offers an example of assumptions of the temporality of refugeehood by 
describing persistent assertions that “new refugees” want to return home as soon as 
possible
74
. Giorgio Agamben, in illustrating the fallacy of this assumption, describes 
circumstances in which the bonds between citizen and state are so thoroughly severed 
that becoming stateless is preferable to returning to the country of origin. Though 
Agamben’s comments were made in relation to stateless persons rather than refugees in 
particular, his observation is equally relevant in instances of state persecution. While not 
applicable in every case of displacement, it is certainly important to recognize that, in 
many cases, refugees have no desire to return home, whether because they fear ongoing 
persecution or because they believe they have access to greater livelihood opportunities 
elsewhere. Where refugees have no desire to return to their country of origin, 
refugeehood becomes a permanent and normal condition, rather than temporary and 
exceptional condition. Agier and Agamben’s comments illustrate the divide between the 
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assumption that the temporality of refugee is based primarily on the will of refugees, and 
the reality that many refugees do not wish to return but rather to build new lives in 
asylum or resettlement states. When refugees can neither integrate into countries of first 
asylum, move forward to resettlement states, nor return to their countries of origin, they 
become trapped in a state of permanent temporality. 
 Equally important in interrogating the assumed temporality of refugeehood is the 
increasing incidence of protracted displacement. UNHCR defines protracted 
displacement as that which lasts for over five years, during which a refugee’s basic rights 
and social, economic and psychological needs are unfulfilled in the asylum state. 
Currently, approximately seven million refugees are facing protracted displacement – 
two-thirds of the total population of refugees globally
75
. Further, in contrast to 
approaches to durable solutions taken prior to and during the Cold War, the international 
community is less likely to offer resettlement opportunities to refugees, leaving a 
significant number of individuals and families with only one option: attempt to rebuild 
their lives in asylum states, which offer little assistance and few economic opportunities. 
Where asylum states accept refugees with the understanding that they will be either 
resettled or repatriated when appropriate, denying refugees the opportunity to settle 
within their borders, the temporality of refugeehood is even more pronounced. However, 
in such cases, temporality is imposed by the circumstances and structural conditions of 
displacement rather than a characteristic inherent to refugeehood. 
 These assumptions form essential characteristics of the refugee master category. 
Agier suggests that, in contrast to those in political exile prior to and during the Cold 
War, who “carried with them a powerful ideological message and a sense of personal 
honour,”76 contemporary refugees experience displacement as, “an accumulation of 
losses, rejection and flights, of family, administrative or material imbroglios, the only 
outcome of which, for those who experience it, is to have themselves as victims and 
receive emergency humanitarian aid.”77 This conceptualization views refugees as 
perpetual victims who are unable to help themselves, and eliminates the voices of 
individual refugees from structuring the international response. Based on these 
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characteristics, as emphasized by states, international organizations and the media, the 
“ideal” refugee – or those who most closely adhere to the refugee master category – is 
one who is part of a collective movement, and who exists in a prolonged state of 
emergency and temporality. The mass displacement of Somalis into Kenya, of Burmese 
into Thailand, or of Afghans into Pakistan offer examples of displacement that adheres to 
the refugee master category.  
 
2.2. Conclusion: Inclusions, Exclusions, and Practical Implications of the Refugee 
Master Category 
 
Before turning to the impact of the refugee master category on concepts of refugeehood 
and refugee response policies, it is important to recall Saskia Sassen’s critique of master 
categories generally. Sassen argues that master categories obscure as much as they 
illuminate, and that over time, develop their own “power logics and exclusions” 78. From 
this perspective, the following section discusses first, who is included in the refugee 
master category and who is excluded from it, and second, the practical implications of 
these inclusions and exclusions on refugee policy.  
Based on the refugee master category's characteristics, as identified by Agier, 
Chimni, Agamben, and others, a refugee construct emerges that parallels the 
displacement experiences of many refugees in Africa and Asia throughout the 1990s – for 
example, displacement of Somalis into Kenya, of Burmese into Thailand, or of Afghans 
into Pakistan. Indeed, as discussed, the foundations of the contemporary refugee 
construct are to be found in this period. Such refugee movements are characterised by 
large-scale flight triggered by a specific, exceptional event. The exceptionality of the 
event justifies the emergency measures taken in response. It is assumed that, once the 
trigger event is appropriately dealt with, refugees will return home, their displacement is 
understood as temporary. Refugees are thus perceived – and defined by international 
refugee law – as large numbers of people displaced by exceptional events and on a 
temporary basis.  
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Given this characterisation, it is possible to rationalize response policies that 
favour containment, provided that displacement is, in fact, temporary. It is within this 
context that policies such as camp confinement – discussed further in Chapter 3 – 
emerged. However, as noted, significant numbers of refugees cannot and/or will not 
confirm to this construct. Many are fleeing by themselves, rather than en masse. Many 
are fleeing not single, exceptional events, but constant and ongoing persecution – such as 
ongoing persecution of Darfuri and Nuba people in Sudan. Many are fleeing situations 
that make it impossible to return, or who have no desire to return to their country of 
origin – such as Eritreans fleeing conscription who face imprisonment, torture, and 
possibly death at the hands of the government if they return. Many have the awareness 
and agency to make decisions about how they wish to protect themselves and their 
families – such as well-educated, middle-class Iraqis settling in Cairo. Refugees fleeing 
such circumstances are entitled to the same rights to protection and services, yet are often 
disadvantaged by policies directed solely to refugees within the narrow, politically-
motivated definition of the refugee master category – namely those who settle in 
designated refugee camps.  
International refugee law can be understood as intimately related to the refugee 
master category, in that the refugee master category provides the conceptual framework 
through which refugee law is interpreted and translated into refugee policy. When the 
relationship between the refugee master category, refugee law, and refugee policy is 
understood in this way – as cyclical and self-reinforcing – it is possible to understand, 
though problematic, how treatment of refugees has changed so dramatically when 
international refugee law has remained largely static. Even more problematic is the 
inability of either international refugee law or the refugee master category to adequately 
describe contemporary displacement. Given the significance of the refugee master 
category as the conceptual framework through which responses to contemporary 
displacement are formulated, it is essential to ask, what are the implications of the 
inclusions and exclusions inherent in the refugee master category, as currently 
constructed, on refugee policy?  
 As discussed, the refugee master category has become biased toward camp-based 
refugees, favouring an outdated refugee construct rather than evolving in tandem with 
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contemporary displacement. Camp-based refugees conform to the international refugee 
regime’s insistence that refugeehood is an exceptional, temporary circumstance that 
affects people en masse, whereas urban refugees contradict these understandings of 
refugeehood by their individualized flight, their desire to normalize their status, and the 
effective permanence of their displacement. Yet within the policy-making context, 
governments and policy-makers are constrained in their ability to adapt to changes in 
refugee discourse by the necessity of developing and implementing refugee policy. 
Policy-making attempts to categorize the socio-political realm in order to effectively 
respond to issues and events. However, when the categories upon which response policies 
are based are flawed, the response will typically be ineffective. These inefficiencies – or, 
in the parlance of the refugee regime, service and protection gaps – are discussed further 
in Chapter 5.  
 Though the camp-centric refugee response regime that developed in response to 
post-Cold War understandings of refugeehood – the foundations of the refugee master 
category – was built on a particular operational logic, that logic was limited to a specific 
set of circumstances. These circumstances portrayed displacement as collective, 
exceptional, and temporary, suited to situations of mass displacement as opposed to 
individualized, permanent displacement during the Cold War. Contrary to the 
propagation of the refugee master category described above, refugees continued – and 
continue to – settle in urban areas rather than camp settings. This trend has, historically, 
been the constant, while camp-based settlement has been the exception, emerging only 
since the end of the Cold War. For example, in Kenya prior to the 1990s, refugees were 
generally permitted to self-settle on a largely permanent basis, leading to frequent 
settlement in urban centres such as Nairobi; camp confinement has only emerged since 
the early 1990s and has not been entirely effective in curbing urban settlement among 
refugees
79
. Although camp-based policies had a significant initial impact on refugee 
settlement patterns, since the early 2000s the proportion of UNHCR’s persons of concern 
living in urban areas has increased dramatically and consistently. Whereas only one 
percent of persons of concern lived in urban areas in 1996, approximately eighteen 
percent had settled in urban areas by 2005, and approximately twenty-seven percent in 
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2007
80
. This figure has stabilized over the past five years, while the proportion of 
refugees residing in camps has dropped to twelve percent
81
. 
Despite their numerical minority, camp-based refugees possess an advantage in 
that their settlement patterns conform to the construct advanced by the refugee master 
category. Further, their settlement patterns benefit dominant states in that, as Agier 
illustrates, they are both marginal and confined largely to the developing world. 
Promoting camp-based settlement, by, for example, criminalizing settlement outside 
designated camps and restricting assistance provided to refugees outside of camps, is thus 
preferred by both host governments and Western states, despite the significant number of 
refugees settling in urban areas. Through the 1990s and 2000s, refugee response policy-
making came to be dominated by the belief that the exception – camp-based settlement – 
was, in fact, the rule. The ensuing policy regime, characterised by policies that perpetuate 
the refugee master category, thus favours the exception, resulting in a policy regime that 
fails to consider the needs of a significant portion of the refugee population. When the 
assumptions underlying the refugee policy regime have so clearly failed to evolve in 
tandem with the realities of contemporary displacement, and result in flawed policies that 
dedicate the vast majority of limited national and international resources to a subgroup 
while neglecting the needs of the refugee population at large, it is essential to re-evaluate 
these assumptions against actual experiences of displacement and the protection and 
assistance needs of refugees writ large. 
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Chapter 3: EMERGENCE OF THE CAMP-CENTRIC REFUGEE RESPONSE 
REGIME – KENYA’S CAMP CONFINMENT POLICIES  
 
Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, responses to refugee-producing 
situations came to rely on large-scale refugee camps. In many ways, camps have 
effectively become a defining feature of refuge and refugeehood, particularly in the 
developing world. This chapter reviews the emergence of camp-centric response policies 
through a case study of Kenya’s camp confinement policies. Camp confinement policies 
require refugees to remain in designated areas, and make it illegal for refugees to live 
elsewhere except under exceptional circumstances. Such policies have been adopted in a 
number of African countries, particularly Kenya and Uganda, and in 2002, over eighty 
percent of refugees assisted by UNHCR resided in refugee camps
82
. The evolution of 
refugee response policies in Kenya, including the emergence of camp confinement as the 
primary mechanism for dealing with refugees, is indicative of the role camps play in the 
geopolitics of refugeehood. While camp confinement policies serve a practical purpose in 
creating a “captive audience” for humanitarian assistance, they also illustrate a desire to 
maintain the temporality and exceptionality of refuge in host countries, and of the state of 
refugeehood itself. 
 Government and international policy responses to refugee situations reveal their 
concepts of and attitudes toward refugees. Camp confinement policies serve geopolitical 
and strategic functions in maintaining the segregation of refugees from domestic 
populations. Over the course of the twentieth century, response policies have evolved, 
depending on the geopolitical and strategic value governments assign to refugees. Since 
the end of the Cold War, dominant states have assigned progressively less strategic 
significance to refugees and refugee protection. A growing emphasis on refugee camps, 
enforced through camp confinement policies, suggests that dominant states feel little 
moral, legal or strategic obligation to assist refugees by either accepting refugees into 
their territory or encouraging host states to permit refugees to pursue independent 
livelihoods through legal, economic, and social integration. Instead, dominant states seek 
their marginalization and confinement in territories other than their own. This chapter 
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undertakes a critical historical investigation of camp confinement policies, locating these 
policies in their geopolitical context. Based on the evolution of refugee camps and camp 
confinement policies, this chapter argues that a camp-centric approach to refugee 
situations forms part of a political strategy that seeks to confine refugees in marginal 
areas, and in doing so, advance a specific conceptualization of refugees that is 
progressively less useful in describing contemporary displacement experiences.  
The objectives of this chapter are to understand the political context giving rise to 
camp confinement policies; to illuminate whose interests are served by camp 
confinement policies, and what effects they have on refugees writ large (including non-
camp refugees and those who leave camps, sometimes irregularly); and to illustrate camp 
confinement policies as both drawing on and feeding into a particular conceptualization 
of refugees that obscures diversity and excludes significant numbers of vulnerable 
individuals who do not fall within the vision propounded by these policies. To achieve 
these objectives, the chapter will address the political and historical context of camp 
confinement policies. Drawing on the Kenyan case, the chapter will evaluate the political 
environment within which camp confinement policies have developed. How have 
concepts of the geopolitical and strategic value of refugees evolved, and has this 
evolution contributed to the development of camp confinement policies? As refugees are 
increasingly politicized, what goals do camp confinement policies seek to achieve, and 
are they successful in achieving these political goals? Whose interests do camp 
confinement policies serve, and who benefits from their application? At the international 
level, do camp confinement policies achieve their objectives and meet the goals of host 
governments and/or the international community?  
 
3.1 Refugees in Politico-Historical Context 
 
Before reviewing B.S. Chimni’s work, which offers insights into the politico-historical 
context surrounding the emergence of camp confinement policies since the end of the 
Cold War, it is helpful to briefly outline the practical impact of the Cold War, and its 
conclusion, on refugees. The international refugee regime as currently structured is 
founded upon massive displacement within Europe between World Wars I and II. Aware 
42 
 
that the international community was not capable of protecting all displaced persons in 
Europe, prioritization was enshrined in the international refugee protection regime based 
on concepts of fundamental, “universal” human rights – particularly civil and political 
rights, despite disputes between Western and Eastern blocs over whether these were 
indeed fundamental or universal. Further, at the outset, the international refugee regime 
was formulated to care for European refugees, rather than refugees from other regions. In 
these nascent years the international refugee regime was never intended to protect 
displaced persons on a global scale. Although the 1967 Refugee Protocol removed 
geographic and temporal limitations on international refugee law, this universalization 
was formal rather than substantive, in particular because established refugee criteria were 
not re-evaluated to consider displacement as a result of non-civil or political grounds
83
.  
 These weaknesses were obscured with the rise of the Cold War, as preoccupations 
with maintaining the binary balance between the Soviet Union (the east) and the United 
States (the west) took centre stage. Both Chimni and Michel Agier argue that, during the 
Cold War, refugees took on greater strategic political value in international relations. 
Refugees fleeing from within the Communist bloc were taken to represent the flaws of 
the Communist ideology, and Western governments accepted them on a largely 
permanent basis, acting as “the land of asylum for the ‘good’ victims of communism.”84 
Within both Eastern and Western spheres of influence, dominant states had an interest in 
projecting an image of stability, making early intervention and conflict resolution a 
strategic priority. Where spheres of influence clashed, resulting in the threat of proxy 
wars, dominant states had an interest in resolution to protect the international balance of 
power, encouraging early intervention to restore stability – stability which frequently 
prevented mass refugee movements.  
The end of the Cold War removed the strategic motivation for intervention in 
refugee producing conflicts and regions. Almost immediately, regions that had previously 
been of strategic importance were abandoned by dominant states, the incidence of regime 
collapse and state failure rose dramatically, and economic woes deepened. Public and 
political opinions toward refugee movements in regions such as Africa and Asia had also 
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shifted: state failure was blamed on internal, rather than international causes, while 
refugees who were able to make their way to the West were portrayed as economic 
migrants rather than “true” refugees. As Roger Zetter argues, the refugee label has 
become increasingly fractured, resulting in the “proliferation of new labels designating 
different kinds of refugee claimants, [underpinning] a deliberately transformative process 
to create far less preferential categories of temporary protection.”85 Further, the use of 
degrading labels such as “illegal asylum-seeker” or “bogus asylum-seeker” have been 
used to embed marginality and dishonesty into understandings of “new refugees”86. 
These labelling processes obscure the increasingly complex nature of forced migration, 
particularly in relation to mixed migration, where forced and voluntary migrants use the 
same routes – and where an individual migrant can be considered both forced and 
voluntary, depending on the weight assigned to each factor motivating their movement. 
This phenomenon was, in part, due to increasingly strict interpretations of 
international refugee law, emphasizing civil and political causes of flight rather than 
generalized violence, natural disaster, and economic upheaval, which are more frequently 
at the root of displacement within the developing world. The changing causality behind 
refugee flows has not been explicitly accounted for in international refugee law, allowing 
states to reject asylum-seekers on the basis that the factors leading to their flight do not fit 
the criteria outlined in the Refugee Convention and Protocol. Though the 1969 OAU 
Convention recognized generalized violence as a legitimate cause for granting refugee 
status, the Convention is only applicable in states who are party to it – that is, OAU 
members – while criteria established in the Refugee Convention and Protocol remain 
applicable in most other states. The need for the 1969 OAU Convention’s expanded 
definition at all illustrates the failure of international refugee law to keep up with the 
changing causality of forced migration.  
Internationally, the Refugee Convention and Protocol have been interpreted by 
Western states in an exclusionary rather than inclusionary manner, limiting the ability of 
“new refugees” to obtain refugee status in the West87. In the post-Cold War world, fewer 
and fewer refugees are considered “legitimate” refugees by the West; marginalization and 
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containment, as Chimni and Agier discuss, translate this perception into policy. The 
impact of these interpretations  are overtly visible in the West, as governments favour 
non-entrée regimes that increasingly restrict refugees from the developing world from 
accessing protection, and in the developing world,  policies such as camp confinement 
create physical separation.  
 
3.2 Refugees in Kenya: From Self-Settlement to Camp Containment 
 
Prior to the 1990s, Kenya was generally hospitable to refugees arriving at its borders. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Kenya hosted between 12,000 and 15,000 refugees, largely 
from Uganda. These refugees were typically granted “full status rights”88, including 
access to work permits and the educational system, as well as the right to apply for legal 
integration through naturalization. This liberal treatment served both political and 
economic functions. Granting refuge to victims of oppression and those fleeing apartheid 
regimes was politically “generous”, and  a logical extension of the government’s support 
for liberation movements in surrounding states
89
. At the time Kenya suffered from a 
shortage of labour, particularly skilled labour, which refugees from professional 
backgrounds could fill. Additionally, refugees from professional classes were viewed as a 
source of new investment
90
. Finally, relatively small numbers of refugees arriving each 
year were fairly easily managed within the government’s reception and assistance 
structures. 
 The 1990s brought political upheaval in East Africa, triggering dramatic increases 
in refugee movements. Internal strife and civil war emerged in Ethiopia, Sudan and 
Somalia and despite the restoration of peace in Uganda, drought conditions beginning in 
1985 pushed many to seek more favourable conditions in Kenya. In the aftermath, the 
number of refugees in Kenya rose from 12,000 to 15,000 throughout the 1980s to around 
400,000 in 1992, stabilizing at 220,000 near the end of the decade
91
. The Kenyan 
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government’s capacity to receive and respond to this influx was quickly overwhelmed. Its 
main reception facility at Thika, for example, had a maximum capacity of only 500 
refugees, forcing new arrivals to settle in the surrounding area. 
 At the same time, Kenya faced challenges that effectively crippled its domestic 
economy. Ongoing financial hardship forced the government to seek assistance from the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which imposed a structural adjustment 
program on Kenya. Based on neoliberal economic principles, the program required 
drastic cuts in government spending, resulting in less government funding for the national 
asylum system. Lacking both the institutional and financial capacity to accommodate the 
mass influx of refugees seeking protection, the government of Kenya pulled out of 
refugee response operations and transferred responsibility to UNHCR. As Avery Burns 
suggests, “it is difficult for Kenyans to want to help others when they seem unable to help 
themselves.”92 Almost immediately, UNHCR established massive refugee camps, 
primarily in Dadaab and Kakuma, channeling aid to these settlements. In order to ensure 
refugees were “UNHCR’s problem”93, Kenya implemented policies requiring refugees to 
remain in UNHCR’s camps, making it illegal for refugees to leave the camps and settle 
elsewhere without government-issued permits.  
 To be sure, camp confinement policies serve an operational objective: creating a 
“captive audience” which can be provided with targeted humanitarian assistance. Faced 
with mass refugee influxes, states and aid agencies are challenged with responding to 
significant housing, medical and sustenance needs, which proves particularly challenging 
when those requiring assistance are geographically dispersed. When self-settlement is 
permitted, identifying individuals and families at risk, let alone providing assistance, 
becomes significantly more complicated. As Karen Jacobsen argues, in the context of 
self-settlement, refugees become part of two larger sub-groups within a national 
population: urban poor, in the case of urban self-settlement – or, more generally, 
impoverished communities – and foreign-born residents94. Both of these populations face 
obstacles accessing the livelihood resources necessary for survival. Given that, for many 
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refugees, one of the key benefits of self-settlement is anonymity, self-settled refugees 
often seek to minimize their contact with authorities, creating self-imposed limitations on 
their ability to access humanitarian services. In addition to these obstacles, refugees often 
face psycho-social barriers to survival, including physical and mental health issues 
resulting from trauma experienced during their displacement and flight. In contrast, 
refugees in camp settings are relatively easily reached, eliminating many of the logistical 
barriers to service provision present in contexts of self-settlement. However, living 
conditions in camps are often poor; basic sanitation infrastructure poses a significant and 
ongoing challenge for camp administrators, let alone ensuring that educational and 
medical resources are available to meet demands. Further, as Jeff Crisp argues, camps 
often suffer from poor security, leaving refugees vulnerable to physical threats which 
camp administrators are unable to counter
95
. Lacking the ability to engage in productive 
activity in camps, refugees from both urban and rural backgrounds find themselves 
grappling to adapt to a life characterised by dependency. From the refugee’s perspective, 
self-settlement often seems the lesser of two evils, despite the significant vulnerabilities 
they face outside of the theoretical protection of the refugee camp. 
In Kenya, refugees choosing to self-settle in contravention of camp confinement 
policies effectively become irregular migrants, and are vulnerable to arrest and detention. 
The Kenyan government, conducts frequent “round-ups” or sweeps in areas of Nairobi 
and other cities where refugees are known to congregate, either forcing refugees to return 
to camps or forcibly repatriating them to countries of origin in violation of the customary 
law principle of non-refoulement. These sweeps are justified on the basis that Kenyan 
refugee law requires refugees to reside in camps, and that Article 2 of the Refugee 
Convention and Protocol obligates refugees to conform to the laws and regulations of 
host states – although neither consider the implications of conflict between national 
refugee law and internationally guaranteed human rights and freedoms, such as freedom 
of movement. While the Kenyan government may be within its rights to enforce its law 
governing the residence of refugees by returning them to camps, the principle of non-
refoulement suggests that refugees should not be returned to places of harm even in cases 
where they contravene national laws.  
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The irregular status of those outside of the camps permits the government to 
characterise these refugees as criminal. As Elizabeth Campbell suggests, “keeping urban 
refugees [in Nairobi] in a state of legal limbo benefits the government, which uses them 
as a scapegoat for a wide variety of social and economic ills plaguing the city.”96 Police 
harassment thus becomes a fact of everyday life, further isolating refugees opting for self-
settlement from both Kenyan society and aid agencies, which are generally prohibited 
from assisting refugees outside of camps. 
 
3.2.1 The Government of Kenya and Refugees in Kenya: Security, Isolation and 
Enduring Temporality 
 
This isolation, however, is not merely an unintended consequence of camp confinement 
policies. Camp confinement has become a strategic political tool, in addition to its 
operational logic. In Kenya, isolation is justified in part on security grounds. Throughout 
the late twentieth century, Kenya has been the victim of terrorist attacks and threats that 
Somalia will attempt to annex its Northeastern Province. Since the rise of Al-Shabaab, 
the Kenyan government has been particularly concerned about the possibility of the 
group’s penetration into refugee camps. A 1997 news report stated that: 
President Moi yesterday said foreign spies and criminals masquerading as 
refugees had invaded Nairobi. President Moi revealed that some of these 
criminals were engaged in incitement at the behest of local collaborators. 
Emphasizing that the government will not allow foreigners to abuse the 
peace and stability in the country, President Moi said that many of them 
were engaged in business as a cover-up for their evil activities.
97
  
 
In 1998, Al Qaeda bombed the US Embassy in Nairobi, and in 2002, a series of hotel 
bombings rocked Mombasa. These events, among others, set the stage for increasing 
securitization of refugee management policy, leading to government crackdowns on 
refugees living in Nairobi and increased security around refugee camps. The government 
went so far as to place former army officers in refugee camps to “support” aid workers in 
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addressing “security issues”98. Isolation, or containment, thus took on a role of preventing 
the “infiltration” of terrorist groups into Kenyan society under the guise of refugeehood.  
Camp confinement policies also serve to reinforce the temporality of refuge. 
Isolation, whether in camp or urban settings, prevents refugees from integrating into the 
national population, emphasizing the temporary nature of their presence in the country. 
Isolation emphasizes the presumed “extreme material precariousness, and the feeling that 
those people who settle there will remain only for a short period.”99 By maintaining a 
state of temporality, the Kenyan government is able to shift the burden of dealing with 
refugees – economically, socially, materially, and so on – to alternative actors, such as 
UNHCR and humanitarian agencies, over both the short- and long-term. Physical 
isolation, while ostensibly focused toward addressing and containing security threats, 
contributes to the overall marginalization of refugees within host states such as Kenya. 
 
3.2.2 UNHCR and Refugees in Kenya: Physical Marginalization and Externalization 
 
As the major facilitator of global refugee assistance and policy implementation, UNHCR 
legitimizes the containment of refugees in camps. In order to assist refugees and 
displaced persons, UNHCR requires the invitation and approval of host states, which also 
develop the policy framework within which UNHCR must operate. The presence of 
UNHCR in a country contributes to the attitude of externalization by removing 
responsibility for the refugee “problem” from host states. In the Kenyan case, as in other 
states opting for a camp confinement approach, UNHCR enforces this policy direction by 
providing aid only in camp settings. When viewed in the context of the strategic 
importance of the refugee construct, UNHCR’s actions are essential in facilitating 
ongoing physical marginalization and externalization.  
Polzer and Hammond argue that, “by seeing, describing and categorizing social 
reality, we also make people and processes invisible.”100 Applying concepts of visibility 
and invisibility to “self-settled” refugees, Polzer and Hammond discuss how both 
governments and UNHCR seek to manage the visibility of refugee subsets to serve 
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institutional interests. For example, by managing the (in)visibility of its subjects, 
governments and agencies can restrict the scope of their obligations to provide protection 
or assistance
101
. Invisibility, these authors contend, is the outcome of relationships 
between those with power and those without: “invisibility is therefore fundamentally 
relational; its impacts depend on the power relations and interests connecting those who 
see and those who are to be seen (or not).”102 Keeping people and processes invisible 
requires power and institutions that have such power can impose visibility or invisibility 
against the will of their subjects. By allowing relying on camp-based solutions and failing 
to advocate for the ability to assist refugees outside of camp settings, UNHCR is 
complicit in the Kenyan government’s attempts to make refugees structurally invisible 
through the enforcement of camp confinement policies. 
 
3.3 Camp Confinement and the International Community 
 
In Kenya and elsewhere, the containment of refugees in camps not only shifts the burden 
of management to UNHCR and other non-state actors, it also ensures that refugees 
remain apart from the domestic population. In this way, camps function to marginalize 
and isolate refugees from the domestic population, preventing their permanent 
integration, and to externalize refugees by shifting the “burden” to UNHCR and other 
non-state actors. Refugee treatment in Kenya is reflective of the emphasis by dominant 
states that displaced populations should remain as much in-situ as possible and only as a 
last resort be offered resettlement. While camp confinement policies are not entirely 
effective at restricting the movement of refugees, they are successful in effecting the 
containment of refugees, as Agier suggests, on the margins of the world – first, far from 
the borders of powerful, Western states, and second, in remote areas within host states in 
the developing world. According to geographer Luc Cambrezy, accommodating refugees 
in camp settings has become “the speciality of poor countries”103. Agier describes those 
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in camps as “a population reduced to the sole imperative of keeping alive far from home, 
in places of waiting.”104 
 Since the conclusion of the Cold War, camp confinement has come to 
characterize the vast majority of refugee experiences in Africa, as well as Asia. The 
geopolitical and strategic value assigned to refugees has plummeted. The parallel 
overriding emphasis on containment in camps, now almost exclusively located in the 
developing world, is closely linked to the political self-interest that is at the heart of the 
international community’s attitudes toward refugees. Rather than permitting refugees 
entry into dominant, Western states through resettlement, these states, through UNHCR, 
encourage a “care and maintenance” approach based on the belief that repatriation should 
be pursued as the primary solution for refugees – regardless of the fact that, for many 
residing in camps, displacement has become protracted and will likely continue for the 
foreseeable future. Camp confinement has become, “a massive and lasting solution, and 
clearly the preferred one in Africa and Asia, to the detriment of the other three solutions: 
repatriation, integration in the land of asylum, and resettlement in a third country.”105 
Given the poor living conditions in camps and the obstacles put in place that prevent 
refugees from actualizing their internationally guaranteed human rights in such settings, it 
can be argued that camp confinement primarily benefits dominant states rather than 
refugees themselves.  
 Camp confinement plays a role in maintaining the conceptual foundations of the 
international refugee regime. Insistence on containment of refugees in marginal areas, far 
from the shores of dominant states, and in a state of extended temporality allows for the 
perpetuation of a refugee concept which portrays refugees to the public and to policy-
makers as transitory, external subjects – “the most distant [and] the least visible”106. 
When the confinement of refugees to camps in marginal areas – typically in the 
developing world – is accepted as a defining characteristic of refugeehood, the 
manipulation of the international refugee regime to achieve this end, as illustrated by 
Chimni, becomes palatable to the public consciousness
107
. Camp confinement policies 
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facilitate the maintenance of a self-reinforcing dialectic by requiring refugees to adhere to 
a particular definitional construct or face consequences, ranging from the withdrawal of 
humanitarian assistance to arrest, detention, and refoulement. Once refugee behaviour is 
conditioned to conform to this construct, response policies based on this construct – such 
as camp confinement policies – may be more easily formulated and legitimized.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
Refugee camps have become a common mechanism for responding to displaced 
populations, particularly in the latter decades of the twentieth century. Refugees early in 
the twentieth century – those fleeing conflicts in Europe, such as the Spanish civil war, or 
from Eastern Europe during the Cold War – tended to have similar political experiences 
with democracy and diversity in their host communities and states. The involvement of 
dominant states such as the US, Great Britain and France in many of these conflicts 
carried with it a desire to “save the world”, coloured by an inherent acceptance of 
democracy and economic capitalism as the best solution for global peace. More recent 
waves of refugees do not share the “European” cultural, religious or political norms and 
present a very different set of needs. Since the end of the Cold War the geopolitical 
response to mass refugee situations has shifted from one of deliberate and quick response 
to one which offers help after the fact and only under well-defined conditions. Two of 
those conditions include the approval of a host state to the presence of UNHCR and the 
insistence of UNHCR on the distribution of aid only in camp environments. The now 
predominant approach of camp confinement as a solution to these “new refugees” 
suggests that there is less strategic value assigned to refugees in the latter twentieth and 
now, the twenty first century. This decline in strategic value has contributed to the 
marginalization and externalization of refugees and the potential creation of large 
populations with unavoidably negative attitudes to the dominant states who largely define 
the rules for international assistance.  
 Marginalization and externalization of refugees occurs in three ways: first, by 
containing refugees in the developing world, far from the territory of typically wealthy 
and healthy Western states; secondly, by physically locating refugees in camps in remote 
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areas within host states; and thirdly, by shifting responsibility from governments to 
UNHCR. While providing aid to a defined location has clear operational advantages, 
camps have become more than they were ever intended to be. Rather than temporary 
places of refuge, they have become long-term cities of impoverishment
108
, where 
refugees face poor living conditions, a lack of personal security and livelihood 
opportunities, and restrictions on human rights. Camp-based refugees have little control 
over their own lives, and their dependence on humanitarian aid is a challenge to their 
ability to assert themselves in relation to the humanitarian government that develops 
around them
109
. As Agier notes in describing discussions with camp-settled refugees, “in 
a repetitive way, the refugees express above all feelings of impotence and uselessness.”110  
Those who choose to leave camps are often targeted as criminal elements and 
increasingly cited as politically dangerous to the host state. Long-term confinement also 
threatens to increase the radicalization of younger refugees who see a lack of will and 
concern from dominant states, rightly or wrongly, as deliberate. At the same time, 
dominant states are more and more cautious about who is granted asylum in an effort to 
maintain their own internal stability and to show their citizens the positive impacts of 
nation-building through immigration. The camp confinement strategy, rather than 
offering a temporary solution to sustain large numbers of people while a more durable 
solution can be found, has evolved into a tactic of avoiding permanent settlement for 
large numbers of displaced populations.  
After many decades of using refugee camps to respond to protracted conflicts in 
the developing world with no noticeable improvement in the outcomes for either host 
states or the hundreds of thousands of refugees, one wonders what critical mass is 
necessary to trigger reconsideration by the international community of its response to 
long-term mass displacements. This reconsideration must address both weaknesses in 
response policies and inaccuracies in constructions of refugeehood that allow for and 
perpetuate flawed policies. A refugee master category that is too narrowly biased toward 
a particular type of refugee disadvantages those that do not fit within its definitions by 
inequitably distributing limited resources and services. When confronted with growing 
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proportions of refugees who cannot or will not conform to the refugee master category’s 
boundaries, the construct of refugeehood faces challenges both in terms of 
conceptualizing refuge more broadly and in terms of providing protection and services to 
these refugees.  
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Chapter 4: THE URBAN REFUGEE CHALLENGE 
 
Despite the efforts of states to condition refugee behaviour by promoting camp-centric 
responses, significant numbers of refugees continue to settle outside of camps and, in so 
doing, pose a challenge to the refugee master category. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
refugee master category is defined by its collectivity, its exceptionality, and its 
temporality. However, the refugee master category is based on concepts of refugeehood 
that reflect the displacement experiences of only a subset of refugees – those conforming 
to camp-centric response policies. Refugees who do not conform to this construct are 
excluded from protection and assistance, and, as illustrated by the Kenyan case study, 
cast as threats to domestic security rather than highly vulnerable individuals and families. 
The camp bias exists in refugee policy to reward refugees who fit within the narrow 
refugee construct and disadvantage those who cannot or will not adapt. 
 While camp-centric response policies grew out of operational logic within a 
particular context, they must be continually evaluated against the evolving characteristics 
of refugeehood. The refugee master category upon which camp-centric policies are 
based, aligns with the strategic approach emphasized by dominant, Western states. This 
viewpoint arises from a combination of enthusiastic humanitarianism and fear of 
involvement. Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal and the United States are well known 
as the original colonizers – in many instances not in a benevolent way. Their twentieth 
century military success, as well as their rise to economic predominance, has resulted in 
them being viewed both as threats and saviours. But faced with fatigue among their 
citizens with respect to continued involvement in violent internecine conflicts far from 
their shores, these states have become much more wary about rushing in with aid of any 
kind. Once too often a toe in the water of humanitarianism has led to a bath of war. This 
historical context, while understandable, appears now to be the only lens through which 
refugee response policies and practices are viewed. The consequences may be devastating 
for all refugees, with urban refugees even more vulnerable to a lack of vision in how to 
keep them safe, let alone offer them any hope of returning to a life of peace and stability. 
And so it is that refugees are to be hosted far from their territorial jurisdiction, confined 
to marginal spaces and kept apart from the host society by emphasizing the temporary 
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nature of their refuge. Such policies are now evident throughout Africa, including Kenya, 
and South East Asia.  Beyond the inequities resulting from the simple mechanics of 
insisting on providing aid primarily within organized camp settings is the growing set of 
facts regarding a problem which is not going away – that is to say, there are more and 
more cases where refugees become caught in a particular place because it is too 
dangerous to return home, or it is perceived that there is nothing to return to. The fact that 
some refugees chose to settle in urban areas is a testament to perhaps the most significant 
failure of camp centric policies – that they fail to come to a proper and lasting end.   
Refugee response policies, rather than considering the best interests of refugees 
themselves, seek to condition refugee behaviour to conform to the characteristics of the 
refugee master category in order to achieve three strategic goals – externalization, 
marginalization, and exclusion. This chapter argues that urban refugees contradict the 
refugee master category because they pursue living conditions that abide by neither 
camp-centric refugee response policies nor the refugee master category – namely, they 
seek socio-economic integration into the host society so that they can recover from the 
trauma experienced in their country of origin and rebuild their lives.  
 
4.1 Externalization 
 
States pursue three key strategic goals by manipulating the international refugee regime 
in their favour: externalization, marginalization, and exclusion. The first strategic goal 
pursued by dominant states through the international refugee regime is the externalization 
of refugees, or ensuring that refugees are primarily hosted outside their territorial 
jurisdiction. Both B.S. Chimni and Michel Agier discuss ongoing attempts to externalize 
refugees. For Chimni, the goal of externalization – or, in his words, containment – is a 
key motivating factor contributing to the promotion of the non-entrée regime, which 
seeks to prevent refugees from entering the Western world. Instead, the non-entrée 
regime seeks to confine refugees to the developing world in order to limit the West’s 
moral obligation to protect and assist refugees by rejecting the exilic basis of refugeehood 
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and removing refugees from Western jurisdiction
111
. Given that the vast majority of 
refugees are hosted in the developing world, far from the territorial jurisdiction of 
Western states, it can be argued that the externalization of refugees has largely been 
successful. Indeed, as geographer Luc Cambrezy notes, the accommodation of refugees 
has largely become “the speciality of poor countries”112. 
 While Chimni observes this trend most clearly in relation to trends in the 
implementation of durable solutions, Agier draws specifically on camp-centric policies to 
illustrate the externalization of refugees. Locating camps far from their territorial 
jurisdictions, dominant, Western states are able to reify the conceptual division between a 
“clean, healthy and visible world” and “the world’s residual ‘remnants’, dark, diseased 
and invisible”113. What obligations persist for Western states to assist refugees are 
translated as providing assistance to developing states and UNHCR to ensure refugees 
can be hosted offshore
114
. This binary construction frequently manifests itself in debates 
over burden-sharing – or burden-shifting – within the international refugee regime. The 
camp-centric refugee policy regime plays a key role in legitimating this informal burden-
sharing, providing a focal point for assistance while disguising the strategic 
externalization of refugees as a humanitarian gesture.  
 Moreover, Agier argues that, in addition to its operational role, the camp-centric 
refugee policy regime fills a further role: control. Camps ensure that host states and 
international organizations exercise authority over camp residents, including limiting 
their freedom of movement. Agier suggests that the development of a camp-based 
regime, particularly in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, functioned to “[close] the gates 
of the developed world”115. Humanitarian intervention in camps, in addition to disguising 
the shifting of the refugee burden to developing states, ensures control over both the 
camps and their inhabitants: “every policy of assistance is simultaneously an instrument 
of control over its beneficiaries.”116 This control function, through camp-centric policies 
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such as camp confinement, conditions the behaviour of refugees in line with both the 
refugee master category and the strategic goals of dominant states. 
 
4.2 Marginalization 
 
The second strategic goal pursued by states through the international refugee regime is 
the marginalization of refugees within host states. Marginalization of refugees or 
containing them in spatially separate areas such as border regions, runs parallel to 
externalization in that both seek to keep refugees apart from their host societies. 
Interesting – and troubling – has been the growth of this type of treatment to refugees and 
asylum-seekers who are able to reach the shores of dominant states. Throughout the 
2000s, European states increasingly relied on camp-based approaches to asylum-seekers, 
including detention and reception centres, while Australia’s “Pacific Solution” literally 
confines asylum-seekers to detention centres on islands off the coast of Australia rather 
than permitting them to enter Australian jurisdiction.  It is note-worthy that policies 
seeking the externalization and marginalization did not originate in the developing world. 
Camp-based approaches are utilized by both developing states with encouragement from 
dominant, Western states, and by Western states themselves, creating layered buffer 
zones as the foundation of the non-entrée regime.  
As noted, Chimni discusses the containment of refugees in their region of origin; 
the marginalization of refugees within these regions is equally as important as their 
externalization from dominant, Western states. Marginalization has the effect of making 
refugees confined to camps, virtually invisible to local populations. As Tara Polzer and 
Lara Hammond argue, making someone or something invisible requires power
117
 – in this 
case, the power to confine refugees to marginal, frontier spaces, thus restricting their 
ability to interact with and integrate into the host society.  
 Agier suggests that the marginalization of refugees is intended to achieve this 
very goal: the separation of refugees from the host society. Locating camps in marginal 
areas – in Agier’s words, “out-places” or “spaces of exception”118 – is the physical 
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manifestation of the conceptual division between refugees and the host society. These 
spatial and conceptual divisions are reified by policies such as camp confinement 
policies, which reward camp-settled refugees by providing livelihood resources, but 
which punish self-settled refugees by withholding protection and assistance – regardless 
of the fact that both are entitled to the same rights and protections under the 1951 
Refugee Convention and 1967 Refugee Protocol. For example, drawing on the Kenyan 
case study described in Chapter 2, those seeking refuge in Kenya are required to reside in 
a refugee camp, located in marginal, border areas, with those choosing to reside 
elsewhere considered irregular immigrants and subject to arrest.. Further, NGOs and 
UNHCR are prohibited from offering assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers outside 
of camps. A senior immigration official within the Kenyan government defended these 
policies in a 1999 interview with Gugliemo Veridrame, saying, “refugees in Kenya 
misbehave because they do not want to go to the camps. If someone comes to my home 
and I tell him where he has to sit, he has to obey, otherwise he leaves!”119 The Kenyan 
government thus seeks to separate refugees from Kenyan society by incorporating 
positive and negative reinforcement into policies on refugee settlement.  
 In addition to preventing local integration, the spatial marginalization of refugees 
permits both formal and informal burden-shifting within host states. One of the primary 
concerns voiced by host states, particularly within the developing world, is that the state’s 
limited resources will be overwhelmed by having to address the material and servicing 
needs of large numbers of refugees. Many host states therefore often prefer to limit their 
involvement in refugee protection and services as much as possible. When refugees are 
spatially segregated in camps, they are unable to access services available to citizens, and 
the burden of providing services – with the exception of camp security – is typically 
borne by international non-governmental organizations and/or UNHCR. As illustrated by 
the Kenyan case study, marginalization has both conceptual and practical benefits for 
host states.  
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4.3 Exclusion 
 
The third strategic goal pursued by states through the international refugee regime is the 
exclusion of refugees from host societies, thus exaggerating the temporary nature of their 
refuge and preventing their integration into the host society. Emphasizing the temporality 
of refugeehood is achieved both by successful spatial externalization and marginalization, 
as well as the conceptual exclusion of refugees from full participation in the socio-
economic, cultural and political life in the host state. From the beginning of the 
contemporary international refugee regime, refugee protection was conceived as 
temporary, surrogate protection that became active when an individual’s country of origin 
failed to offer effective protection. However, as noted, during the Cold War, refugees had 
greater strategic and political value, leading dominant, Western states to view 
refugeehood as a permanent condition. Refugees originating in Europe during the World 
War and Cold War era were accepted more readily as fully functioning members of 
“Western” society and, in an era of economic growth, were positive assets which could 
feed and nurture more growth. Since the end of the Cold War, considerations that refuge 
and refugeehood is and should be temporary has played an increasingly important role 
justifying Chimni’s “myth of difference” and perceptions of “new refugees”120. The 
emphasis on temporality necessarily rejects the exilic basis of refugeehood, and suggests 
that refugees themselves want to return home as soon as possible.  
 For Agier, the exclusion of refugees by emphasizing the temporality of their 
refuge is linked to the exceptionality of asylum, particularly in camps. The very terms 
used to describe refugees suggest, “for the most part a movement that is incomplete, in 
suspense, an instant and a condition that is midway between a point of departure and an 
inaccessible end point, either of arrival or return. ‘Return’ itself denotes a temporary 
shelter, while waiting for something better.”121 Camp settings solidify this perception by 
permitting refugee-producing situations to be cast as temporary states of emergency, with 
definitive beginning and end points – regardless of the evidence of long-term persecution 
and of protracted displacement. For example, many Somali refugees residing in the 
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Dadaab and Kakuma camps in Kenya have been displaced for twenty years, giving a 
“certain duration”122 to camps, despite their purportedly exceptional, emergency nature. 
As Agier states, “the humanitarian sites are supposed to be precarious spaces, always 
provisional. The principle implies that the official end of a war is followed by departure 
of refugees and the closure of the camp”123. If refugeehood is understood as a 
fundamentally exceptional and temporary condition, as suggested by the refugee master 
category and camp-centric response policies, the exclusion of refugees from host 
societies becomes justifiable. That is, the principles of temporality and exceptionality 
assume that displaced persons will return home as soon as possible and, upon doing so, 
regain access to the protection and services of their country of nationality. Further, where 
responsibility for camp-based refugees is shifted from the host state to UNHCR – such as 
in Kenya – developing plans   of any type loses its political importance because refugees 
are considered “UNHCR’s problem.”124 Emphasizing the temporality of refugeehood by 
externalizing, marginalizing and excluding refugees from access to any society absolves 
asylum states of long-term responsibility for refugees, while the growing reality is, the 
original cause of displacement is not being resolved in a manner which encourages 
refugees to return home. 
 Finally, missing from the principles of separation described above are 
considerations of a refugees internationally guaranteed human rights. Numerous scholars 
and researchers have documented a range of human rights violations in camps. Sarah 
Bailey, for example, quoting comments by United States diplomatic and consular staff, 
notes that, “it is a violation of international law to deprive persons of their freedom of 
movement and to confine them in conditions of hardship…”125; Guglielmo Verdirame 
and Barbara Harrell-Bond argue that freedom of movement is essential to the enjoyment 
of numerous other human rights
126
. Verdirame and Harrell-Bond go on to catalogue 
human rights violations that not only occur in camps but that are part of the structural 
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makeup of camps, including rights to employment and adequate standards of living
127
. 
Such restrictions on refugees’ human rights contribute to significant frustration within 
camps. Where humanitarian assistance received by refugees is more generous than 
government assistance received by those residing in proximity to camps
128
, tension 
between refugees and locals. Frustration within camps and tensions between refugees and 
locals can boil over into violence and crime; for instance, Jeff Crisp documents outbreaks 
of violence committed against refugees both by other refugees and local in the Dadaab 
and Kakuma camps in Kenya
129
.  These limitations on and derogations from human rights 
standards may be justified on a temporary basis and in exceptional circumstances. 
However, as discussed, the camp-based response regime has taken on a degree of 
permanence, with many refugees residing in camps for decades with little hope of return 
to their country of origin or onward movement to another destination. Hyndman and Bo 
Viktor Nylund go on to ask, “at what point do civil and political, economic and social, 
and cultural rights outweigh the privileges of safety…”130 This question is especially 
poignant given that many camps take on a prison-like quality, turning highly vulnerable 
displaced persons into prisoners or “permanent deviants”131. Refugees are literally 
“locked”132 in camps in certain locations; as Jennifer Hyndman describes in the case of 
the Dadaab camp in Kenya, 
It is fortified with two security fences made of dry acacia bushes, which 
have sharp spikes that easily puncture the skin… A large staff of guards is 
stationed at the entrance gates to various sections of the compound. At 
night, a number of armed guards provide extra security.
133
 
 
Humanitarian intervention in the form of camps transforms into a policing function; 
rather than simply acting as zones of protection for refugees, the camp functions more to 
protect the host state and host society from refugees themselves.  
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Hyndman and Nylund argue that camps “can provide short-term safety, but they 
also institutionalize long-term exclusion, marginalization, and waste of human and 
financial resources.”134 Indeed, containing refugees in effective quarantine is, as Agier 
argues, “a function of the political inability to conceive their place in society as a 
whole.”135 Camp-centric policies thus become a strategic tool, used in tandem with other 
non-entrée policies that increasingly characterise the international refugee regime, to 
meet other goals and priorities rather than attempting to address the specific – and 
pressing – needs of refugees themselves. Urban refugees’ priorities, in particular, directly 
conflict with the aforementioned strategic goals.  
 
4.4 The Urban Refugee Challenge 
 
Despite the efforts of dominant states to condition refugee behaviour to achieve the goals 
of externalization, marginalization, and social exclusion, significant numbers of refugees 
cannot or will not conform to the refugee construct. During the height of the camp-centric 
refugee regime, the proportion of refugees residing in urban areas was low – 
approximately one percent in 1996
136
. Since then, the proportion of refugees residing in 
urban areas has increased dramatically, reaching approximately twenty-seven percent in 
2007
137
. This increase can be attributed to a number of factors. The urban area option 
might be evaluated as “less bad” than the camp asylum one – either through hearsay or 
previous experience. For example, having resided in a camp, refugees may choose to flee 
a second time in order to improve their living conditions. Or, having sought refuge in a 
camp for the duration of a particular conflict, the camp may have closed, leaving refugees 
to either return home or seek refuge elsewhere. Whatever the reason, the relevant fact is 
urban self-settlement is on the rise without a concomitant following of resources to 
reduce the suffering experienced from an identifiable crisis. It is this gap in protection 
that is most glaring when set against the general policy and practice which requires a 
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refugee to be conceptually defined, in part, in terms of where they can be contained and 
counted.   
Giorgio Agamben argues that refugees challenge the concepts of the “nation-
state” and the “rights of man”, urban refugees challenge the concept of refugeehood – by 
exposing the limitations of the refugee master category’s usefulness in structuring the 
international refugee regime. Urban refugees pose a clear challenge to the “ideal” refugee 
defined by the refugee master category. They do not necessarily flee in large groups, but 
instead may be an individual or a single family. They are not necessarily fleeing 
exceptional circumstances, but rather, as Agamben suggests, a series of persecutory 
actions that cause an irreparable break between citizen and state. Consequently, their 
flight is not necessarily temporary; rather, they may seek a permanent home where they 
can rebuild their lives and recover from the trauma experienced in their country of origin.  
This latter point may be the most significant challenge that urban refugees pose to 
the refugee master category, and by extension to the strategic goals of dominant states vis 
a vis the international refugee regime. Despite widespread discourse on burden-sharing 
within the international refugee regime, the priority of dominant, Western governments is 
more akin to burden-shifting, in that integration in neighbouring countries is, for Western 
governments, the “cornerstone of national and international refugee policies by which 
permanent solutions are sought…”138 – to the chagrin of developing states into which 
refugees are to be integrated. Rather than residing in marginal areas apart from society, 
urban refugees seek to locate themselves in the heart of their host society. While their 
motivations vary, the desire the build a new life, characterised by integration into the host 
society, is a recurrent theme.  
According to Gaim Kibreab, integration is: 
an economic, social and cultural process by which refugees become 
members of the host society on a permanent basis irrespective of how 
things develop in their countries of origin. Refugees are accepted on a 
permanent basis. This is followed by legal integration whereby the 
refugees concerned acquire the citizenship of the country of their asylum 
through naturalization.
139
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Kibreab’s definition of integration is set forth here due to both its emphasis on the 
potential permanence of refugeehood, and its separation of integration from the 
naturalization process. While legal integration through naturalization is an important step 
in establishing the legal validity of a refugees’ integration into the host society, it cannot 
be does not necessarily need to be the only indicator of integration, particularly given the 
numerous obstacles both host and resettlement states place on the attainment of 
citizenship by refugees. Though integration is a somewhat subjective concept, with a 
variety of meanings depending on the particular context, it can be understood to 
encompass economic integration actualized by employment, and social integration 
actualized by cultivating social networks and accessing social services with legal 
integration actualized through naturalization as the highest achieved outcome. 
Although flight from persecution is a key characteristic of refugeehood according 
to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Refugee Protocol, it is not necessarily the only 
factor pushing individuals and families to flee. As increasing discussion of mixed 
migration suggests, and scholars such as Roger Zetter and Alexander Betts affirm, the 
refugee label is no longer a discreet category that can easily capture the displacement 
experiences of all who fall within the realm of such experiences. In many cases, the 
inability to build a sustainable economic livelihood as a result of systematic 
discrimination or to be surrounded by adequate protection resources can contribute to 
displacement and flight. Evidence suggests that when a refugee or family of refugees is 
burdened by economic instability in the country of asylum, it is unlikely that they will be 
able to fully recover from the trauma of their displacement. Being caught in economic 
limbo exacerbates the perception of being stuck in a state of flux, unable to return home 
and, in most cases, unable to seek refuge elsewhere. It is therefore unsurprising that 
refugees place significant importance on economic integration in the host society. For 
example, research on refugees in Cairo shows that, despite significant protection 
concerns and rampant discrimination, integration through employment leading to 
financial self-sufficiency is the primary concern
140
.  
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Opportunities for economic integration play an important role for many refugees 
in determining where to see refuge, where such choices are available. Karen Jacobsen 
argues that a relatively small portion of refugees actually choose to live in camps, and 
those that do not often believe that the economic opportunities offered by urban 
settlement outweigh the potential legal instability of urban residence, even when their 
residence contravenes camp confinement policies
141
. Urban settings offer greater 
opportunities for economic integration than camps, where refugees are generally reduced 
to victims and passive recipients of humanitarian aid
142
. By seeking economic integration 
through employment, urban refugees seek the stability that will allow them to overcome 
their trauma and rebuild their lives. However, in doing so – and in tandem with the 
increasing incidence of protracted displacement – their refuge becomes a more permanent 
condition, rather than the exceptional, temporary condition, suggested by dominant states 
through the refugee master category and reflected in camp-centric refugee policies.  
By seeking refuge in urban settings, refugees are also seeking stability through 
social integration, such as cultivating informal networks and accessing social services. 
Large urban centres in developing states, such as Nairobi, Cairo, Johannesburg, Kampala, 
Bangkok, and others, host significant refugee populations, creating social networks that 
newcomers can access. Newcomers can seek housing, financial and material assistance, 
and information about social service organizations through networks of refugees already 
settled in host cities
143
. Similarly, many refugees believe that they will have greater 
access to social services, such as health care and education, in urban centres. However, 
social services are often shared with citizens, stretching the limited resources of host 
states, which is of particular concern to developing states which lack the resources to 
provide social services to citizens. For example, as discussed in the following chapter, 
many of the reservations expressed by Egypt to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 
Refugee Protocol relate to social services such as education, public relief, and social 
security, on the basis that, as a developing country, Egypt was not in a position to provide 
such services for refugees. Competition for social resources causes tension between host 
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state societies and refugees, leading host states to seek to prevent social integration.
144
. 
However, once urban refugees have gained access to social networks and services 
through social integration, they regain a degree of agency that was lost during flight. 
Rather than remaining passive recipients of humanitarian aid, they are able to regain a 
degree of self-sufficiency and reassert some of their independence. In Cairo, for example, 
many NGOs assisting refugees rely heavily on social networks within refugee 
communities to publicize their services and reach clients
145
. In extreme cases, being able 
to access legal aid organizations and other advocacy networks may discourage host 
governments from detaining, expelling or refouling urban refugees, whereas refugees 
residing in camp settings remain “the most distant, the least visible and the least 
integrated”146 and, due to this invisibility, vulnerable to the whims of the state “that keeps 
the power to control and abandon [them].”147 From the refugees’ perspective social 
integration may make expulsion from an urban area less likely due to both the logistical 
challenges of locating refugees among large urban populations, and the ethical sensitivity 
of undertaking expulsion from within a highly visible urban environment. The social 
service organizations and NGOs that refugees seek to access by moving to urban areas 
can, in this case, perform a dual function – first, providing direct assistance to refugees, 
and second, monitoring and raising awareness about government practices toward 
refugees. When these considerations are accounted for, it is clear why economic and 
social integration are so highly valued by refugees, in terms of the role integration plays 
in personal recovery and the resources that can be attained through integration.  
 At the root of their desire for integration is the aspiration to find a permanent 
solution to their situation. Displacement causes significant disruption, and, faced with an 
international policy regime that emphasizes the temporality of refugeehood writ large 
and the temporality of their refuge in particular, re-establishing a stable and sustainable 
life takes on greater importance. In camps, Agier suggests, “nothing can ever be totally 
achieved… the incompleteness of the integration process is co-substantial to them, 
                                                          
144
 Ibid., 278. 
145
 Based on informal discussions with refugees and NGO workers during a legal aid internship, August 
2012 – April 2013.  
146
 Agier, Managing the Undesirables, 45. 
147
 Ibid., 45. 
67 
 
quarantine being their very horizon.”148 However, seeking permanent solutions in the 
host state runs contrary to one of the key assumptions underlying Chimni’s “myth of 
difference”: that refugees want to return to their country of origin as soon as possible149. 
Agier illustrates the significance of the “myth of difference” using the example of an 
applicant for resettlement in the US: 
… a young Somalian, Mohammed, a second-year student of medicine 
when he fled Mogadishu, tells how he passed an “oral test” for possible 
resettlement in the United States and everything was going well, until he 
“tripped up” on a single question. When he was asked if he wanted to 
return eventually to Africa, he answered with a sincere and enthusiastic 
“no”, understanding only too late that his examiners would rather have 
heard “yes” as a proof of attachment to his original identity.150 
 
Agier’s example suggests that, although the candidate was being interviewed for 
theoretically permanent resettlement, the belief that refugees should want to return to 
their home state – and by extension, the belief in the temporality of refugeehood – is so 
deeply embedded into understandings of refugeehood that it holds influence despite the 
implied permanence of resettlement. Interestingly, in this case a lack of attachment to the 
home state and identity poses a barrier to acceptance by the resettlement state, in contrast 
to more common assertions that too much attachment to the home state and identity can 
pose barriers to integration into host or resettlement societies.  
Through their behaviour, urban refugees suggest that seeking refuge is not 
necessarily an exceptional or temporary condition, but rather a road to permanent 
settlement and integration. Similarly, by seeking integration, urban refugees express their 
opposition to the strategies of externalization and marginalization – or “distancing of 
undesirables”151 – pursued by dominant states through the international refugee regime. 
Rather than accepting camp-based solutions, where, as Agier suggests, 
“humanitarianism… becomes a second-best to integration for all those who, for various 
reasons, we do not want to integrate into the social and political world of human beings, 
keeping them instead in vague waiting-rooms, on the margins of the world…”152, urban 
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refugees challenge the refugee master category by seeking permanent settlement in the 
spatial heartland of host states. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter argues that urban refugees challenge the refugee management strategies 
pursued by dominant states – externalization, marginalization and exclusion. Dominant 
states use the refugee master category, which assumes refugeehood is a collective, 
exceptional, and temporary condition, to rationalize these strategies, leading them to 
pursue camp-centric refugee response policies. In contrast, urban refugees seek to settle 
in the conceptual and spatial heartland of host states and pursue economic and social 
integration in host societies. Economic and social integration represent opportunities to 
recover from the trauma of flight, re-establish stable livelihoods, and regain the 
independence lost during displacement. By avoiding camps and intentionally seeking 
integration, urban refugees disrupt the principles of the refugee master category which 
are increasingly transforming refugeehood into a permanent condition. This disruption 
makes it difficult for dominant states to uphold the strategic priorities enshrined in camp 
centric policies. Further, as will be discussed in the following chapter, host states also 
place significant restrictions on refugees’ access to economic and social integration, 
leaving significant gaps in protection and services unaddressed. By withholding access, 
host states attempt to condition all refugees’ behaviour to conform to the refugee master 
category. Neither party has shown a willingness to acknowledge that the refugee master 
category is inapplicable to many contemporary displacement crises and that there is a 
pressing need to re-evaluate the refugee concept in light of the contemporary 
displacement experiences generally and the increasing urbanity of refugeehood in 
particular.  
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Chapter 5: PROTECTION GAPS FACING URBAN REFUGEES – EGYPT AND 
LEBANON 
 
In contrast to camp settings, urban areas offer opportunities for economic and social 
independence. While camp settings effectively require refugees to give up a variety of 
human rights, such as freedom of movement, in exchange for humanitarian assistance, 
urban settlement allows refugees opportunities to lay claim to their rights while they seek 
their own economic and social livelihoods. By constructing camp-settled refugees as 
passive victims whose primary function is to be the recipient of humanitarian aid, camp-
based refugee policies strip refugees of individual agency and exacerbate power 
imbalances between refugees, states, and “humanitarian government”.153 These power 
imbalances prevent refugees from resisting policies implemented upon them in an 
organized manner. Camp-based policies further embed the temporality and exceptionality 
of refugeehood, and facilitate the exclusion of refugees from host societies. Michel Agier 
describes camp-settled refugees as “people waiting apart from society”154; however, 
significant numbers of refugees are no longer content to wait. Despite what UNHCR 
describes as the “iconic image” of refugees – “row upon row of white tents in a sprawling 
emergency camps” – over half of refugees assisted by UNHCR reside in urban areas155. 
Refugees seek shelter in urban areas to gain access to medical services, educational 
opportunities for children, humanitarian aid, or even resettlement. Perhaps the most 
significant feature of refugee urbanization is the challenge to the dominant assumption 
that refugees want to return home. Seeking refuge in urban areas represents for many the 
opportunity to leave behind the trauma of their flight and build a new life. 
The objective of this chapter is to understand the specific protection gaps 
affecting urban refugees in Egypt and Lebanon, as indicative of protection gaps affecting 
urban refugees in the Middle East and North Africa region and elsewhere. Despite 
differences in the legal and policy frameworks between Egypt and Lebanon, the service 
gaps affecting urban refugees are strikingly similar. The most compelling observation 
arising from this inter-country comparison is the underlying rationale: fear that, in 
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granting urban refugees full access to rights and services, refugees would settle 
permanently in host states and integrate into host societies. Withholding protection and 
services is a simple means to discourage refugees from permanent settlement and to 
reinforce the temporary nature of refuge and refugeehood.  
Although there are many protection gaps documented in the literature and 
discussions regarding refugees, the purpose of this chapter is to highlight protection gaps 
that most frequently and most deeply impact the ability of urban refugees to establish and 
sustain their livelihoods. Shortfalls have been grouped into three categories: gaps in legal 
status; gaps in economic capacity; and gaps in social services. Legal status gaps relate to 
the legal recognition given to refuges and whether this recognition offers protection from 
arbitrary arrest and deportation. Economic capacity gaps concern whether refugees are 
granted the right to work, and whether substantial administrative obstacles prevent them 
from actualizing this right. The ability to earn an income is a prerequisite for obtaining 
other key livelihood resources, including food, housing, and medical attention. Social 
services may attempt to address some of these gaps, but reliance on charity is 
fundamentally unsustainable over the long term. Finally, social service gaps relate to the 
availability and accessibility of services including education and health care, which are 
indicative of the potential for the integration of urban refugees into host societies.  
 Although the following case studies are intended to illustrate protection gaps 
facing urban refugees throughout the Middle East – and other developing regions – the 
extent of the gaps is not solely the blame of these host countries. While host states have a 
clear responsibility for protecting refugees – particularly those which, like Egypt, are 
signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Refugee Protocol – many of the 
expected protections and services have a significant financial impact. Given that most 
refugees are hosted in the developing world, where states often face challenges providing 
for their own citizens, there is a clear role for the international community to assist in the 
provision of protection and services. As Karen Jacobsen notes, “what does it mean for the 
international community to say that refugees have rights, but do nothing to ensure that 
they enjoy them?”156 
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5.1 Seeking Asylum in Middle Eastern States 
 
Prior to examining protection gaps facing urban refugees in Egypt and Lebanon, it is 
helpful to describe the legal environment within which urban refugees are offered 
protection. The legal status of refugees in the Middle East has varied over time and 
between states, depending on both domestic and regional political dynamics. Only four 
states – Egypt, Israel, Yemen, and Iran – are parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
1967 Refugee Protocol, and of these, only Israel has adopted domestic refugee 
legislation. Middle Eastern states have largely relied on the UNHCR to deal with 
refugees on their behalf.  
The events of September 11, 2001, deepened hostility towards refugees in the 
Middle East. Discourse surrounding refugees, particularly refugees from the Middle East 
and North Africa, has increasingly centered on the potential security risk  refugees may 
pose to host countries. The securitization of asylum-seeking has created significant 
obstacles to improving the treatment of refugees both in the Middle East and around the 
world. Securitization has also given Middle Eastern governments a “free pass” to 
persecute refugees for the sake of “protecting security”157. Despite this discouraging 
trend, refugee rights remain on the agenda for Middle Eastern governments. In 2003, the 
OIC Islamic Summit passed a resolution on “Problems of Refugees in the Muslim 
World”, which called for greater co-operation with UNHCR and for those states not party 
to the Refugee Convention to work toward accession. In 2004, the Arab League affirmed 
support for the right to seek asylum outlined in Article 28 of the Arab Charter on Human 
Rights. Yet despite these declarations, no new refugee legislation has been adopted by 
Middle Eastern governments and no additional Middle Eastern states have signed on to 
either the Refugee Convention or Refugee Protocol. Global security remains a higher 
priority and increasingly provides the framework through which refugee issues are 
addressed.  
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Despite differences in legal and policy frameworks for implementing refugee 
protection in Egypt and Lebanon, the experiences of urban refugees in each state 
illuminate protection gaps facing urban refugees both in the Middle East and in the 
developing world at large. Though legal and policy frameworks influence the experiences 
of urban refugees, there are great similarities between protection gaps in Egypt and 
Lebanon. It is these parallels that permit comparison between the case studies that follow.  
 
5.2 Egypt 
 
Egypt is home to a significant number of refugees and asylum-seekers. Official estimates 
suggest that 114,000 refugees and asylum-seekers reside in Egypt, excluding 
approximately 50,000 Syrian refugees and asylum-seekers, although unofficial estimates 
range up to 500,000
158
. Thirty five nationalities have been documented, including sizable 
Sudanese, Iraqi, Eritrean, Somali and Ethiopian populations. The vast majority of 
refugees in Egypt reside in Cairo, with a smaller number residing in Alexandria. Though 
Egypt has been described as generally “tolerant”159 of refugees within its borders, they 
nonetheless face numerous legal and socio-economic barriers to achieving stability and 
rebuilding their livelihoods. 
 
5.2.1 Legal Protection Gaps 
 
Egypt is a signatory to both the Refugee Convention and Protocol, and to the 1969 
Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa (OAU Convention). An individual may be recognized as a refugee 
under either – or both – conventions. In theory, the availability of two protocols expands 
protection space for refugees, by broadening the definitions used to qualify a displaced 
person. For example, in addition to the basic refugee definition articulated in the Refugee 
Convention and Protocol, which focusses on individualized persecution for reasons of 
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race, nationality, religion, political opinion, or social group, the OAU Convention 
provides for the recognition of persons who are fleeing generalized violence or 
aggression by a foreign power. Given the prevalence of ongoing conflicts in the countries 
of origin for most refugees in Cairo – Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Iraq –  the 
OAU Convention significantly enhances opportunities for protection. Sadly, in practice, 
it does not appear that dual protection regimes translate into better protection or 
assistance for refugees.  
Prior to ratifying the conventions, the Egyptian government expressed 
reservations to a number of provisions, including articles providing for elementary 
education, public relief, the right to work, social security and personal status, effectively 
exempting itself from otherwise internationally accepted expectations of providing basic 
socio-economic rights to refugees. Most significantly, the government reserved the right 
to regulate the entry of refugees into the labour force by issuing work permits
160
. The 
effect of this reservation will be discussed further below; here, it suffices to say that 
Egypt’s reservation to the right to work is the single biggest impediment to refugees’ 
ability to establish and maintain stable livelihoods and by extension to remove 
themselves from requiring ongoing state aid.  
Recognition of refugee status in Egypt offers little legal protection; as Katarzyna 
Grabska notes, “due to their unstable legal status and the often hostile attitude of the local 
population, many refugees constantly fear arrest and harassment.”161 Random arrests, 
arbitrary detention and police harassment are particularly prevalent within refugee 
communities originating from Africa, although Iraqi refugees have reported similar 
abuse. A shared religious identity does not seem to reduce hostility from the Egyptian 
community or being a target for state harassment
162
. In illustrating an ongoing protection 
crisis facing refugees in Cairo, Michael Kagan describes increased incidences of 
refoulement and prolonged and arbitrary detention over the past five years
163
. The 
vulnerability of refugees to harassment by legal authorities is exacerbated by a lack of 
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awareness among front-line law enforcement officers about UNHCR identification 
documents and by UNHCR’s inability to successfully intervene in legal or national 
security matters on behalf of refugees
164
. Despite confirmed recognition of their status by 
the Egyptian government, refugees in Cairo continue to face a significant absence of legal 
protection.  
 
5.2.2 Economic Protection Gaps 
 
As noted above, while acceding to the Refugee Convention and Protocol, Egypt entered 
reservations regarding the right of refugees to obtain employment, presumably to protect 
its national labour force, which already faces high rates of unemployment. To be clear, 
refugees are not expressly denied the right to work; however, in order to obtain formal, 
legal employment, refugees must obtain individual work permits which impose 
significant administrative burdens on both refugees and potential employers. Employers 
must meet labour market tests, including proving that the national labour force is unable 
to meet job requirements, as well as paying fees to sponsor refugees to obtain work 
permits.  
As a result of these obstacles, most refugees – not unlike many Egyptian citizens 
– must rely on employment in the informal economy. A survey conducted among Iraqi 
refugees in Cairo, arguably the most well-educated and highly qualified refugee 
population in the city, showed that only twenty-two percent has obtained either formal or 
informal employment
165
. Studies of Sudanese refugees suggest that most work 
“sporadically, with no job security, and often under exploitative conditions”166. 
Employment rates vary between refugee groups, as well as within refugee communities; 
for example, female refugees are somewhat more likely to obtain work as domestic aides, 
which offers a degree of income stability, while male refugees typically rely on 
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employment as day labourers
167
. What emerges is a clear trend toward reliance on 
informal employment to support refugee livelihoods in Cairo. Unfortunately, 
participation in the informal economy has significant drawbacks, leaving refugees 
vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.  
Lack of economic resources impacts virtually all aspects of refugee livelihoods in 
Cairo, particularly the ability to secure housing. Stefan Sperl argues that the “true 
predicament” of refugees in Cairo is an uneven income to expenditure ratio168. While the 
cost of living for refugees rises significantly from year to year, the ability to earn a 
consistent wage to cover living costs does not improve in tandem. Where Egyptian 
nationals are able to access rent controlled housing, refugees are left to compete for 
housing in private rental markets with other foreigners, where rental prices are much 
higher and subject to arbitrary increases. As a result, refugees are forced into over-
crowded housing arrangements with poor sanitation and little personal security
169
. Where 
housing in metropolitan Cairo is unobtainable, many must reside in shantytowns in fringe 
areas, where “a windowless room in a dwelling under construction costs some $18US per 
month”170. In the absence of secure employment, many refugees rely heavily on 
allowances from UNHCR and Caritas, which cover less than one-third of household 
costs. Furthermore the allowances have been reduced by an average of seventy-two 
percent in keeping with UNHCR’s shift from “care and maintenance” to “self-reliance” 
in dealing with refugees in urban areas
171. Egypt’s reservation to the right to work for 
refugees , while understandable in the context of its own workforce, has the effect of 
exacerbating desperation and potentially creating social unrest among refugees as a result 
of extended impoverishment.  
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5.2.3 Social Service Protection Gaps 
 
Social services for refugees are similarly uncertain. A 1954 Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) between Egypt and UNHCR formalized UNHCR’s significant 
role in determining refugee status and providing social services for refugees and asylum 
seekers. The MOU articulated UNHCR responsibility for registration, education, health 
care, and social welfare services. To address the needs of refugees, UNHCR works with 
partner agencies and NGOs, including CARITAS, AMERA, CRS, Refuge Egypt, the 
Egyptian Red Crescent, and Islamic Relief Worldwide, as well as numerous community 
and faith based organizations. While it has been argued that the creation of a social 
services network separate from social services provided to Egyptian nationals may 
contribute to divisions within Egyptian society and the growth of xenophobia, it is clear 
that without the social services provided by UNHCR and its implementing partners, 
refugees and asylum-seekers would be significantly worse off. 
 Since 2005, refugees in Cairo have been eligible for primary health care services 
at government health institutions. However, after accessing medical attention at public 
hospitals and clinics, refugees report concerns about the quality of care, discrimination 
and racism among doctors, and fears of intentional malpractice, up to and including organ 
theft
172
. Secondary health care services are primarily provided by Caritas, which works 
with medical service providers and specialists as needed through a referral system. The 
cost of treatment is then split between the individual refugee, who typically pays for 
thirty to fifty percent of the cost, and Caritas, which is reimbursed by UNHCR
173
. While 
cost-sharing appears reasonable, it is largely unaffordable for the majority of refugees in 
light of the broader economic context facing refugees in Cairo, particularly their inability 
to obtain formal employment. Work in the informal economy provides cash wages which 
are barely sufficient to cover food or rent, let alone medical expenses, even at a reduced 
rate
174
. In cases where medical treatment is expensive – for example, surgical procedures 
– Caritas may decline to assist with even partial funding. Where medical treatment 
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requires speciality attention not available in Egypt, refugees have been advised to seek 
resettlement
175
. Altogether, despite the presence of an institutional framework intended to 
assist urban refugees obtain medical attention, refugees themselves feel chronically 
underserved in this area. One survey conducted among refugees in Cairo indicated that 
additional assistance in accessing health care was desired above all other forms of 
assistance
176
. 
 Access to education for refugee children in Cairo is another significant concern. 
In general, with the exception of Sudanese children, refugee children have limited access 
to public education. However, even Sudanese children often fall victim to administrative 
obstacles and discrimination; Grabska notes that, “although officially Sudanese refugee 
children with valid residence permits have the right to public education, bureaucratic 
procedures, overcrowded schools and racial discrimination often experienced by pupils 
make access to government schools impossible.”177 As a result, most families, resort to 
sending their children to schools run by faith-based organizations; even there refugees are 
often limited by sectarian restrictions on enrollment
178
. Finally, these alternative schools 
are not accredited by the government, resulting in graduating students being ineligible to 
take state examinations required to earn a diploma which would qualify them for access 
to further educational opportunities
179
.  
Taken together, social service gaps compound legal and economic protection 
gaps, rendering integration into life in Cairo extremely difficult. As a result the majority 
of refugees in Cairo live a precarious existence, caught in a semi-permanent limbo 
between their inability to return or to move elsewhere. By leaving barriers to integration 
unaddressed, characteristics assumed to be present under the refugee master category – 
specifically temporality and exceptionality– are embedded into refugee policies, the 
attitudes of the general public, and hence the daily lives of refugees. By casting 
refugeehood as a temporary and exceptional condition – despite the presence of refugees 
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who have resided in Cairo for decades – the Egyptian government, and by extension the 
international community justify behaviour whose main purpose is to exclude and 
marginalize more than it is to protect and assist refugees.  
 
5.3 Lebanon 
 
In contrast to Egypt, Lebanon hosts a significantly smaller and more heterogeneous 
refugee population
180
. In January 2012, approximately 10,000 refugees and asylum-
seekers were registered with UNHCR’s Regional Office in Beirut (RO Beirut), excluding 
Syrians displaced into northern Lebanon due to the ongoing conflict in Syria. The 
majority of Syrians hosted in Lebanon are housed in camps outside Beirut. As the focus 
here is on urban refugees in Beirut, protection gaps facing those in camps will not be 
discussed. At present the most numerically significant refugee population in Lebanon 
continues to be Iraqis, who compose over eighty percent of refugees registered with RO 
Beirut. ,t is estimated that the number of Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR is 
approximately one-fifth of the total population of Iraqis residing in Lebanon
181
; however, 
for various reasons, the vast majority chose not to register with RO Beirut, and as such 
the population of Iraqi refugees residing in Lebanon is likely larger. Smaller communities 
from other countries, such as Somalia and Sudan, also reside in Beirut. In spite of a much 
smaller refugee “problem”, the Lebanese government expresses “less tolerance and a 
high level of rejection” towards refugees, exacerbating protection gaps facing refugees 
within its jurisdiction
182
.  
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5.3.1 Legal Protection Gaps 
 
Unlike Egypt, Lebanon is not a signatory to either the Refugee Convention or Protocol. 
While refugees entering Lebanon are registered and provided identification by UNHCR, 
this identification is largely ignored by Lebanese authorities except to the extent that 
those who have such identification can apply for short term residence permits. These 
permits must by necessity be frequently renewed and can be administratively difficult and 
expensive to obtain – if they are renewed at all. If, for instance, Lebanese authorities 
determined that refugees should be encouraged to leave the country, they would simply 
deny residence permits forcing them to leave or remain illegally. Individual refugees 
have little recourse, although UNHCR has, on occasion, intervened to legalize the 
residence of refugees in Lebanon. Because of the difficulties in obtaining and renewing 
residence permits, most refugees in Lebanon – particularly Iraqi refugees – reside in the 
country illegally. One survey conducted among Iraqi refugees in Beirut found that almost 
eighty percent entered Lebanon illegally
183
. While some are able to regularize their status, 
many more lapse – or relapse – into illegality if and when they are unable to renew their 
residence permits. As a result, refugees in Lebanon are extremely vulnerable to arbitrary 
arrest, detention, and expulsion. According to UNHCR, detention of refugees in Lebanon 
is significantly higher than in neighbouring states
184
. Although in 2008 UNHCR was able 
to intervene with Lebanese authorities to regularize the status of approximately 600 
detained refugees
185
, the vast majority live in fear of arrest and detention.  
 A lack of legal status has further psychosocial impacts that impair the ability of 
refugees to rebuild and sustain their lives. The constant fear of being discovered prevents 
many refugees from accessing health care or other social services
186
, and causes refugees 
to congregate on the fringes of Lebanese society, avoiding contact with locals, and 
physically, in suburbs of Beirut
187
. Similarly, because refugees have a lack of legal 
recourse to address unfair treatment, many find themselves taken advantage of by 
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exploitative employers and landlords
188. Refugees strive to “endure a permanently low 
profile” to avoid detection189. On the other hand, their inability to access the formal 
labour market pushes many refugees into criminal economic activities such as 
prostitution or human smuggling, reinforcing the association between illegal residency 
status and criminal behaviour among both the Lebanese public and government 
authorities
190
. Economic and social service protection gaps, discussed further below, are 
thus closely related to legal protection gaps facing urban refugees in Lebanon. 
 
5.3.2 Economic Protection Gaps 
 
As in Cairo, refugees in Beirut lack the right to obtain formal, legal employment without 
obtaining work permits. As in Cairo, these can be administratively difficult and expensive 
to obtain so that again, the vast majority of refugees in Lebanon rely on informal 
employment, which exposes them to abuse and exploitation in both wages and working 
conditions. However, due to their uncertain legal status, refugees working informally in 
Beirut are arguably more vulnerable to exploitation, because they must trust that their 
employer will not turn them over to the authorities. Knowing that refugees have no legal 
recourse, employers have been known to take advantage of refugee workers
191
.  
Where refugees in Beirut are unable to find employment in the informal economy, 
studies have documented a turn to criminal activities. Refugee women become involved 
in prostitution, while refugee men – particularly young men – become involved in human 
smuggling, drawing in many cases, upon networks forged during their own initial, often 
illegal, transit
192
. These patterns of exploitation are particularly troubling due to increased 
youth involvement in the workforce among refugees in Lebanon. Believing that children 
and youth are less likely to be arrested and detained due to their irregular legal status, 
families frequently chose to send youth to obtain employment and support their 
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families
193
. Putting aside the impacts on education and development of refugee youth, the 
participation of youth in the workforce – particularly in criminal activities such as 
prostitution and human smuggling – exacerbates the myriad social vulnerabilities of 
refugees in Beirut, not to mention the impact of these activities on the rest of Lebanese 
society and the need for additional government policing resources.  
The high cost of living in Beirut further impacts the unstable economic situation 
of refugees in the city. While refugees in Egypt are subject to higher rent prices than 
nationals, the overall cost of living excluding housing is fairly low. Lebanon, on the other 
hand, is considered a middle income country, and the overall cost of living is reflective of 
this status. In terms of housing, in particular, landlords have been known to exploit the 
irregular status of refugees, knowing that they have no legal recourse to unfair treatment. 
Finally, there is a high degree of privatization of “public” services in Lebanon, including 
health care and education, the cost of which further stretch the limited financial resources 
of refugees.  
 
5.3.3 Social Service Protection Gaps 
 
Because Lebanon is not a signatory to either the Refugee Convention or Protocol, the 
government accepts no responsibility for providing social services for refugees within its 
borders. In its stead, UNHCR and community and faith-based organizations – including 
Caritas, the AMEL Association, RESTART, the Lebanese High Relief Commission, the 
Danish Refugee Council, the Makhazoumi Foundation, and Association Justice et 
Misericorde – offer social services to allow refugees to meet their immediate livelihood 
needs.  
However, as is the case in Egypt, many basic and fundamental social services are 
controlled by the government. For example, though a significant number of refugees 
indicate that they suffer from acute and chronic illnesses, such as diabetes and 
hypertension, they are reluctant or unable to seek medical treatment at government health 
facilities for fear of being exposed as illegal residents. When accessing the public health 
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care system, refugees are further confronted with a system that suffers from chronic 
underfunding and endemic overcrowding
194
. One of the most significant differences 
between Egypt and Lebanon is the extent of privatization in tertiary social services. For 
example, while basic emergency medical care may be available through state-run 
institutions, specialist care is outsourced to private care providers. This privatization 
significantly increases the cost of treatment, often beyond refugees’ means. Combined 
with a deep-seated fear of exposure, many refugees simply chose to suffer in silence. 
Access to education in Lebanon, on the surface, is the one potential ray of hope. 
In 2008, the Lebanese Ministry of Education issued a circular calling on both public and 
private schools to facilitate the registration of refugee children, and UNHCR provides 
school supplies and grants to cover tuition fees. The positive impact of this decision is 
debatable. UNHCR states that approximately eighty percent of refugee children between 
the ages of four and seventeen are enrolled in either primary or secondary school, while 
an independent study of Iraqi refugee children, the largest quotient of refugee children 
living in Beirut, suggested that less than sixty percent of Iraqi refugee children between 
the ages of six and seventeen actually attend school
195
. This discrepancy is due to several 
factors, including differences in curricula between Lebanon and Iraq, second language 
requirements in Lebanon, and overcrowding in schools
196
. As noted above, because many 
children are taken out of school to work, the drop-out rate among refugee children is 
high
197
; UNHCR has noted that school enrollment is one of the most pressing issues 
facing the refugee community in Beirut. Therefore, although UNHCR has made progress 
in promoting and facilitating the entry of refugee children into the Lebanese educational 
system, their efforts have been virtually negated by the challenging economic situation 
facing refugee families. As in Egypt, the social, economic and legal protection gaps that 
structure refugee lives in Lebanon are inextricably intertwined, making it difficult for 
urban refugees in Beirut to establish sustainable livelihoods.  
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5.4 Trends in Protection Gaps 
 
Despite significant differences in the legislative and policy environments structuring 
urban refugee experiences in Cairo and Beirut, a number of common protection gaps 
emerge. Although refugees in Cairo benefit from the recognition of refugee status, they 
receive little more protection than those in Beirut – both face arbitrary arrest and 
detention. Urban refugees in both countries are effectively excluded from the formal 
economy, leaving them vulnerable to exploitative wages and working conditions, 
severely impacting their ability to secure stable housing. Access to health care is impeded 
by a lack of financial resources, and by a degree of fear – in Egypt, related to 
discrimination and intentional malpractice by doctors, and in Lebanon, related to the 
potential of exposing illegal residency. Both countries have made attempts to address the 
education of refugee children by implementing policies to allow refugees access to public 
and private educational systems; yet in practice, refugee children face significant 
challenges in accessing education. These protection gaps are indicative of challenges 
facing urban refugees throughout the Middle East, and in other developing states. 
UNHCR staff frequently note that assisting geographically dispersed refugee populations 
entails a host of obstacles not present when dealing with a “captive audience” in camp 
settings
198
. 
The most compelling trend arising in Egypt and Lebanon is the relationship 
between protection gaps and the inability of urban refugees to integrate into their host 
community. Despite UNHCR’s advocacy of a policy of “self-reliance” among urban 
refugees, state policies – or the lack thereof – appear to undermine the ability of refugees 
to attain a sustainable livelihood. While UNHCR seeks to effectively wean refugees away 
from institutional assistance, state policies work to make refugees more dependent on aid. 
For example, the denial of the right to work in both Egypt and Lebanon prevents refugees 
from earning a stable income and benefiting from labour protection laws, leaving them 
vulnerable to exploitation and abuse and impairing their ability to sustain themselves and 
their families in the long term. Despite the frequently articulated rationale of the necessity 
of protecting the ability of domestic populations’ access to limited state resources, there 
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is also a discernible fear that closing protection gaps – for instance, by granting refugees 
the right to work – will result in refugees choosing to permanently settle in host states. 
This alternative is unacceptable to the vast majority of host states, including Egypt and 
Lebanon, which see themselves as temporary hosts; Egypt, in particular, has explicitly 
denied that local integration is an option for those seeking refuge within its territory. 
Integration runs contrary to the characteristics assumed by the refugee master category, 
as it implies permanence and normalization of refugeehood, and subverts the strategic 
priorities of both host states in the developing world and Western states. Refugees who 
are legally, economically, and socially integrated cannot be excluded, marginalized, or 
externalized, and host states are harder pressed to reduce their responsibilities toward 
refugees. 
The existence of protection gaps is therefore rooted not only in state self-interest 
and operational challenges, but also in a belief in the exceptionality and temporality of 
refugeehood. Exceptionality and temporality have long been fundamental pillars of 
refugeehood.  From the outset, refugeehood was conceived as temporary, surrogate 
protection that came into effect under exceptional circumstances, while an individual’s 
country of nationality would not or could not protect them. Refugeehood was never 
imagined to be a permanent – or even long-term – condition. However, the increased 
incidence of protected refugee situations, particularly since the end of the Cold War, has 
challenged the pillars of exceptionality and temporality. Unwilling to acknowledge the 
erosion of these principles, many host states in both the developed and developing world 
cling to the exceptionality and temporality of refugeehood in the hope that doing so will 
exonerate them from long-term responsibility for refugees within their jurisdiction. 
Integration suggests a degree of permanence, as refugees replace the ties severed with 
their country of origin with ties forged with their host state and society. Urban refugees 
explode the notions of exceptionality and temporality, as unlike camp refugees, they 
cannot be sequestered from the local population in a sustained state of emergency. 
In both Egypt and Lebanon, the possibility of integration is severely curtailed by 
the denial of access to core livelihood assets – security from arbitrary arrest and 
detention, legal employment, and access to social services. This attitude can be partially 
attributed to a fear of “Palestinization” of refugees living in Egypt and Lebanon, or the 
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facilitation of long-term settlement of refugees in host states
199
. This temporality or “in-
betweenness” is completely institutionalized in Lebanon, where Iraqi refugees are 
removed from the international refugee regime altogether, due to Lebanon’s non-
recognition of refugee status. While Lebanon may provide temporary residence permits 
to urban “refugees”, this only exacerbates a “feeling of transitory residence”, highlighting 
the incompleteness of flight from the horrors of home to a “dream destination” that has 
not yet been reached
200
. Urban refugees are stranded between a lack of long-term 
alternatives in the host state and, increasingly, an inability to return home due to the 
protracted nature of conflicts in countries of origin. The shrinking number of resettlement 
spaces available suggests parallel attitudes among developed states
201
. If the preservation 
of exceptionality and temporality is understood as essential to the international refugee 
regime, the persistence of protection gaps can be interpreted as serving a strategic 
function in upholding the foundations of refugeehood.  
 The insistence on the exceptionality and temporality of refugeehood, particularly 
in urban settings, is further highlighted in the inability of refugees in either Egypt or 
Lebanon to become naturalized. Naturalization, while not the sole indicator of permanent 
integration, is frequently cited as a key step in the process. Article 1C(3) of the Refugee 
Convention states that refugee status ceases to apply when an individual acquires a new 
nationality and enjoys the protection of their new country of nationality, a process which 
occurs through naturalization. Once naturalized, a refugee gains all rights and privileges 
granted to a citizen of the state, and ceases to require the protection of the surrogate 
refugee regime. However, in both Egypt and Lebanon, naturalization is denied to 
refugees, regardless of the length of their residency in either country or of their social or 
economic integration into national communities. This denial “exacerbates the feeling of 
transitory residence”202, reinforcing the exclusion of refugees from the national 
community, legally, economically and socially. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
A desire to prevent permanent integration of urban refugees leads both Egyptian and 
Lebanese authorities to leave glaring legal, economic and social service protection gaps 
unaddressed. In both states, refugees face significant obstacles accessing a key economic 
need – the right to work. Although Egypt offers greater legal protection than Lebanon 
due to its accession to the Refugee Convention and Protocol, in practice urban refugees in 
both states are vulnerable to arbitrary arrest and detention. In spite of the reality of long 
term displacement, a continuing environment of insecurity and instability prevents 
refugees from rebuilding their lives and becoming productive consumers and citizens in 
their host state.   
Fundamentally, protection gaps which prevent integration, such as those facing 
urban refugees in Cairo and Beirut reinforce the characteristics assumed by the refugee 
master category. The refugee master category constructs refugeehood as a fundamentally 
collective, temporary, and exceptional condition; in contrast, urban refugees and their 
efforts to achieve legal, economic, and social integration suggest that refugeehood is 
more aptly conceptualized as an individual condition that is effectively normalized 
through its increasingly protracted nature. Despite the changing nature of refugeehood, 
host states in the developing world and dominant, Western states continue to base refugee 
policies on the existing refugee master category due to its convergence with their 
strategic priorities – exclusion, externalization, and marginalization. Ignoring the growing 
trend of urbanization among refugees and their specific protection needs must necessarily 
lead to a host of new economic and social problems, the least positive outcome for all 
parties. Clearly, an alternative concept of refugeehood which moves beyond the original 
master category characteristics and incorporates both contemporary displacement 
experiences and evolving refugee needs is overdue.  
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Chapter 6: CONCLUSION 
  
This thesis seeks to address the primary question, “What are the impacts of Agier’s 
conception of the refugee master category, translated into camp-centric refugee policy, 
on urban refugees?” This thesis set out to answer questions surrounding the experiences 
and status of urban refugees with respect to the concepts of the refugee master category, 
specifically, how the refugee master category conceptualizes refugeehood, and how this 
conceptualization fails to reflect the displacement experiences of a significant portion of 
the refugee population. This thesis further addressed the impact of an exclusionary 
refugee construct on the development of refugee response policy by examining how  
states seek to condition refugee behaviour to conform with the refugee master category, 
and how by consequence,  states disadvantage those who fail to conform to the refugee 
master category. I argue that the international refugee regime bases policy-making on a 
refugee master category that is heavily tilted towards characteristics of collectivity, 
exceptionality, and temporality, and that these characteristics have become the overriding 
perception of refugees in the popular consciousness. These characteristics are advanced 
in order to justify policies whose priorities are externalizing, marginalizing, and 
excluding refugees rather than addressing the needs of refugees themselves. Above all, 
those refugees who do not conform to the characteristics advanced by the refugee master 
category  and who, by making a different location choice in response to their personal 
crisis – namely urban refugees – challenge the priorities of international refugee policy 
and face significant structural protection gaps. 
 I contend that the refugee master category favours camp-settled refugees while 
disadvantaging urban refugees. Relying on a camp-centric refugee master category 
allows states to justify policies and practices that externalize, marginalize, and exclude 
refugees and therefore to a large extent create a class of persons whose existence 
becomes one of permanent need rather than rehabilitation. Urban refugees in particular 
pose a challenge to the camp-centric master category, illustrating its inability to describe 
their displacement experiences. In spite of attempts to act upon their wishes and desires 
to integrate somewhere that is safe, being outside the camp exposes them to a myriad of 
service and protection gaps which render most of their efforts futile. These protection 
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gaps become part of a circle of failure to escape, reinforcing behaviour which conforms 
to the camp-centric conceptualization of refugeehood. That is, rather than overcoming 
their trauma and rebuilding their lives, refugees remain wary of authority, living on the 
fringes of civil society and pursuing, in some cases, desperate measures to survive.  
 This thesis began by introducing the statistical significance of urban refugees as 
well as some of the unique protection and servicing challenges they face. Chapter 1 
outlined the conceptual framework through which the concept of refugees generally, and 
the disadvantaging of urban refugees in particular, would be addressed. As this author 
argues that the challenges facing urban refugees are causally linked to a refugee 
construct, or master category, that favours camp-settled refugee response policies – and 
camp-settled refugees themselves – over urban settlement, Chapter 1 undertook a review 
of literature articulating and describing concepts of refuge and refugeehood.  
Chapter 2 sought to define the characteristics of the refugee master category and 
illuminate overriding assumptions of who is and who is not a refugee. Drawing from the 
works of Michel Agier and B.S. Chimni, this chapter describes how the foundations of 
the refugee master category have evolved since the Cold War. Assumptions about 
refugeehood prior to and during the Cold War have given way to “new refugees”, whose 
characteristics, Chimni notes, are perceived as fundamentally different from Cold War 
refugees and who therefore merit different treatment from the international refugee 
regime and dominant, Western states. Three key characteristics of the refugee master 
category were discussed: the collective nature of displacement and flight; the 
exceptionality of seeking refuge; and the temporality of refugeehood. Based on these 
three characteristics, it is possible to define the parameters of refugeehood – and in doing 
so, to understand that refugees who do not conform to these characteristics, regardless of 
their Convention status, are excluded from the protections and benefits of refugeehood.  
Chapter 3 investigated the relationship between the refugee master category and 
refugee policy, arguing that refugee response policies have increasingly emphasised 
camp-based settlement so as to make real and practical the characteristics of refuge, in 
turn conforming to the concept of refugeehood. Policies that favour camp-based 
settlement, such as camp confinement policies, have come to dominate the international 
refugee response regime since the 1990s, despite the fact that significant numbers of 
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refugees continue to settle in urban areas. Using the case study of Kenya’s camp 
confinement policies, this chapter describes the geo-political context surrounding the 
emergence of camp confinement policies, and highlights that the apparent beneficiaries of 
camp confinement policies are not refugees themselves but the hosting state and the 
international community. This chapter also describes the UNHCR as a major facilitator in 
the strategic use of camp confinement policies. Finally, this chapter links camp 
confinement policies to the strategic goals of states in their interactions with the 
international refugee response regime: to promote a specific concept of refugees – the 
refugee master category – in order to justify the externalization and marginalization of 
refugees. 
Chapter 4 discussed at greater length the purpose and effect of the strategic goals 
of externalization, marginalization and exclusion, which can be observed in the refugee 
response policies within the international realm, policies largely framed by dominant, 
Western states.  This chapter touched on some additional differences between the ideal 
version of a refugee and those that flee to urban areas. They are different because they do 
not necessarily flee in large groups, but instead may be an individual or a single family. 
They may be fleeing a series of persecutory actions that cause an irreparable break 
between citizen and state, rather than a single cataclysmic event. Consequently, their 
flight is not necessarily temporary because they may never be able to return to their 
country of origin. In contrast, urban refugees seek to settle in the conceptual and spatial 
heartland of host states and economic and social integration in host societies. By actively 
pursuing a location where there is a possibility of integration, urban refugees transform 
their refugeehood into a permanent and normalized condition, upsetting the strategic 
foundations of the refugee master concept.  
Chapter 5 drew on case studies of urban refugees residing in Egypt and Lebanon 
to illustrate the restrictions host states place on the ability of refugees to achieve 
integration. State-imposed restrictions create additional complex legal, economic, and 
social service protection gaps for urban refugees, and contribute to an environment of 
instability and insecurity which fundamentally reinforce the temporality and 
exceptionality of refugeehood. By perpetuating these gaps, host states – with the 
complicity of the international community – disadvantage urban refugees to condition 
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their behaviour in conformity with the refugee master category, rather than accepting that 
the refugee master category is fundamentally flawed and re-evaluating the refugee 
concept in light of contemporary displacement experiences generally and the increasing 
urbanity of refugeehood in particular.  
I have argued that the refugee master category embeds particular characteristics – 
namely collectivity, exceptionality, and temporality – into refugee policy discourse, 
allowing national governments and international institutions to advance three apparent 
strategic priorities – externalization, marginalization, and exclusion. These strategic goals 
are pursued even though these defining attributes do not necessarily reflect the 
displacement experiences of a significant number of refugees – specifically urban 
refugees.  
To condition refugee behaviour in conformity with the refugee master category, 
states adopt camp-centric response policies which have led to the emergence of a camp-
biased refugee policy regime. Further, the bias towards camps manifests itself at both the 
national and international level. At the national level, camps are in most instances, the 
only alternative through which refugees may be officially recognized within another 
country’s borders. As described through the Kenyan case study those found in 
contravention of camp confinement laws are subject to penalties including forcible 
relocation to the camp and, in some cases, refoulement. In addition, the Kenyan 
government restricts the ability of UNHCR and other NGOs to offer protection and 
assistance outside of camps. In this way, governments deliberately construct camps as the 
only legitimate response to refugee influxes, while purposefully limiting the resources 
available to urban refugees. These actions run counter in theory, to the rights and 
protections offered refugees as articulated in international refugee law, which makes no 
distinction regarding where a refugee seeks shelter.  
At the international level, both international response agencies and dominant 
members of the international community clearly favour camp-based responses. In the 
Kenyan case, UNHCR established large camps almost immediately after responsibility 
for refugee management was transferred to it by the Kenyan government. Some have 
gone so far as to question whether UNHCR should provide assistance to refugees in 
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urban settings
203. The agency’s recent shift from “care and maintenance” to “self-
reliance” suggests that urban refugees will not benefit from the same protection and 
assistance as camp-based refugees. The inequitable distribution of response resources is 
the major cause of long-standing protection gaps for urban refugees, even in states where 
seeking refuge in camps is not an option.  
Alice Edwards offers an interesting critique of UNHCR’s 2009 Policy on Refugee 
Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas (Urban Refugee Policy), which suggests that, 
despite some recognition of the urbanization of refugeehood, a camp-bias is still 
prevalent in refugee response policies at the international level. The Urban Refugee 
Policy claims as its partial purpose to shift the agency’s working ethos from a focus on 
camps to recognizing the legitimacy of urban refugeehood. However, despite recognizing 
that UNHCR protection should not be impacted by the location of asylum, the Urban 
Refugee Policy is limited to non-legal terminology describing “protection space” rather 
than rights-based language with legal foundations. Further, Edwards argues that in its 
concluding pages, UNHCR’s Urban Refugee Policy “seems to suggest that one of the 
aims of the document is to acknowledge that if camp environments improve, motivations 
for leaving them will be reduced and there will be fewer refugees seeking protection in 
[urban areas].”204 The Urban Refugee Policy, rather than seeking to truly establish urban 
areas as legitimate protection spaces for refugees, plays “into the hands of governments 
operating camp confinement policies who argue that UNHCR should spend its time 
improving camp conditions rather than engaging with urban refugees.”205 
In addition to the direct efforts of the camp-bias to condition refugee behaviour in 
conformity with the refugee master category, international refugee policy directs 
attention and response resources to refugee camps. In states where seeking refuge in 
camp settings is generally not an option, such as Egypt and Lebanon, the national 
government rests its case of doing less on  the limited resources they are allotted to 
support urban refugees, as much as the covert desire to perpetuate the exceptional and 
temporary nature of refugeehood.  As illustrated by the Egyptian and Lebanese cases, 
urban refugees face almost impossibly intractable legal, social and economic protection 
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gaps. In the absence of reasonable means to create sustainable livelihoods they remain in 
precarious isolation within the heart of the host society, which severely hinders their 
ability to build sustainable livelihoods, perpetuating the precariousness of their asylum 
and preventing their integration into their host society. States attempt to influence refugee 
settlement patterns by implementing a camp-centric refugee policy regime, as illustrated 
in Kenya, and by disadvantaging those who do not conform to camp confinement 
policies, as discussed in Egypt and Lebanon. If refugee behaviour can be conditioned in 
conformity with the refugee master category, both Western and non-Western states can 
justify refugee policies that aim to externalize, marginalize, and exclude refugees. In this 
way, both the refugee master category and the camp-centric response policy regime built 
upon it can be seen as playing key roles in the non-entrée regime that currently 
characterises international attitudes toward refugees.  
Addressing flaws in the refugee master category and policies built upon it will 
require ongoing re-evaluation of popular concepts of refugeehood in light of 
contemporary displacement experiences. Numerous scholars have described the changing 
nature of conflict and sovereignty. A similar dialogue, with a view to clarifying the 
evolution of refugeehood, must be undertaken with respect to the refugee master 
category. However, it is essential that such debate rapidly cross over from academia, not 
only into the policy-making realm but into the public consciousness. Re-evaluation of the 
refugee master category must begin with the recognition that displacement and 
refugeehood take on many forms, last for varying durations, and occur in numerous 
locations. It must be recognized that different choices of refuge, including seeking 
settlement in urban areas, can be legitimate responses to displacement, and that there is 
value in supporting these choices. For refugees whose original lifestyle centered in an 
urban area, the result is a certain familiarity and opportunity for independence from 
national and international aid. For a host state, it is more challenging, but over as little as 
the medium term it could mean new loyal entrants into the national population and active 
contributors to growth of the national economy. Adopting a human rights-based approach 
to interpreting international refugee law and developing refugee response policies may 
assist in facilitating such debate. What has become clear through the previous fifty years 
of the international refugee regime is that a state-centric approach to displacement and 
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refugee management is not conducive to achieving sufficient, substantive refugee 
protection. 
One of the key issues that must be addressed in re-evaluating the refugee master 
category is the contrast between the increasing permanency of displacement – manifested 
in the long life of purportedly temporary refugee camps and the preference of many 
refugees for resettlement or integration over repatriation – and the persistent assumption 
that refugees want to return home as soon as possible. Though initially conceived as a 
temporary condition to ensure surrogate protection in the absence of state protection, 
refugeehood has evolved to become an almost normalized state of being. It is not unusual 
for refugee families displaced for generations to now include members who have never 
entered their country of origin. If refugeehood is understood as a potentially permanent 
condition, policies that emphasize only externalization, marginalization and exclusion 
must be questioned and more effort should be directed to best practices for integrating 
refugees into host states as well as to increasing opportunities for other places of 
permanent resettlement.  
Finally, it must be recognized that re-evaluation and debate cannot occur solely 
among host states in the developing world, or among refugee response agencies such as 
UNHCR; in order to achieve substantive and lasting change within the international 
refugee regime, dominant, Western states must engage in meaningful evaluation of their 
involvement in and attitudes toward the international refugee policy regime. As Katja 
Luopajarvi writes, “when demanding that states act responsibly internally… and 
externally, towards the international community, we must also ask the international 
community to act responsibly when stepping in to provide surrogate assistance and 
protection.”206 The question that remains is, how can dominant, Western states be 
encouraged to engage in such self-reflection, when the contemporary refugee policy 
regime aligns so closely with their strategic priorities? Though this question lies at the 
root of numerous proposals for reform in the international refugee policy regime, 
including burden-sharing and issues linkage, it remains the most difficult to answer.  
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Agier argues that, “what on reflection proves genuinely useful [to refugees] is… 
to resist by all means possible the establishment on a global scale of a regime of 
exceptionalism… that is of interminable delay, as well as other forms of quarantine in 
which so many millions of undesirables are confined.”207 To make such resistance 
effective will require intensive re-evaluation of the popular conceptualization of 
refugeehood. Numerous scholars have articulated structural and conceptual flaws in 
international refugee law and policy, but such flaws are rooted so deeply within the 
refugee construct that effective solutions cannot be discussed solely at the level of law 
and policy. Rather, it is necessary to problematize the refugee master category itself, 
evaluating whether its characteristics reflect contemporary displacement experiences or 
politically-driven ideas of who should be protected and assisted, and how protection and 
assistance is implemented. In light of the growing portions of the refugee population 
facing protracted displacement, settling in urban areas and seeking, if not resettlement, 
integration into their host community, is it still possible to describe refugeehood as a 
large-scale phenomenon that is exceptional and temporary? If refugeehood is no longer 
collective, exceptional, and temporary, how can policies that aim to externalize, 
marginalize, and exclude be justified? Conceptual questions must be answered before it 
will be possible to seek comprehensive, holistic solutions to the flaws in the international 
refugee response policy regime that trap urban refugees in limbo, unable to return, unable 
to move forward, seeking durability that is always out of reach.  
  
                                                          
207
 Agier, On the Margins of the World, 72. 
95 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abuya, Edwin Odhiambo. “Past Reflections, Future Insights: African Asylum Law and  
Policy in Historical Perspective.” International Journal of Refugee Law 19  
(2007): 51-95. 
 
Agamben, Giorgio. “We Refugees.” Symposium 49 (1995): 114-119. 
 
Agier, Michel. “Between War and City: Towards an Urban Anthropology of Refugee  
Camps.” Ethnography 3 (2002): 317-341. 
------------------. On the Margins of the World: The Refugee Experience Today.  
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008. 
------------------. Managing the Undesirables: Refugee Camps and Humanitarian  
Government. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2011. 
 
Ajygin, Erin. “Livelihoods and Family Formation Among Eritrean Refugees in Cairo.”  
MA Thesis, American University in Cairo, 2010. 
 
Al-Obaidi, Abdul Kareem, and Sherif Atallah. “Iraqi Refugees in Egypt: An Exploration  
of Their Mental Health and Psychosocial Status.” Intervention 7 (2009): 145-151. 
 
Amnesty International. “Broken Promises: Egypt’s Military Rulers Erode Human  
Rights.”  
www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/MDE12/053/2011/en/47be269e-b67a-42f4-
835b-787f91044e04/mde120532011en.pdf (accessed October 2012). 
----------------------------. “Fear, Flight, and Forcible Exile in the Middle East.”  
www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE01/001/1997/en/17e5591e-eaa6-11dd-
9f63-e5716d3a1485/mde010011997en.pdf (accessed October 2012). 
---------------------------. “State of Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa:  
January to mid-April 2011.”  
www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/POL10/012/2011/en/a31cf35a-0d47-4374-82ff-
a4d440398861/pol100122011en.pdf  (accessed October 2012). 
 
Aukot, Ekuru. “’Better a Refugee Than a Turkana in Kakuma’: Revisiting the  
Relationship Between Hosts and Refugees in Kenya.” Refuge 21 (2003): 73-83. 
 
Azzam, Fateh, ed. A Tragedy of Failures and False Expectations: Report on the Events  
Surrounding the Three-Month Sit-In and Forced Removal of Sudanese Refugees  
in Cairo, September-December 2005. Cairo: American University in Cairo, 2006. 
 
Bailey, Sarah. “Is Legal Status Enough? Legal Status and Livelihood Obstacles for Urban  
Refugees.” MA Thesis, Tufts University, 2004. 
 
Barnett, Laura. “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee  
Regime.” International Journal of Refugee Law 14 (2002): 238-262. 
 
96 
 
Betts, Alexander. “Survival Migration: A New Protection Framework.” Global  
Governance 16 (2010): 361-382. 
 
Briant, Natalie, and Andrew Kennedy. “An Investigation of the Perceived Needs and  
Priorities Held by African Refugees in an Urban Setting in a First Country of  
Asylum.” Journal of Refugee Studies 17 (2004): 437-459. 
 
Burns, Avery. “Feeling the Pinch: Kenya, Al-Shabaab and East Africa’s Refugee Crisis.”  
Refuge 27 (2010): 5-15. 
 
Buscher, Dale, and Lauren Heller. “Desperate Lives: Urban Refugee Women in Malaysia  
and Egypt.” Forced Migration Review 34 (2010): 20-21. 
 
Buscher, Dale, Karen Jacobsen, and Andrea Lari. “Addressing Urban Displacement:  
Specific Needs and Vulnerabilities.” Paper presented at a seminar of the  
Brookings Institute-University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement,  
Washington, USA, March 10, 2008.  
 
Campbell, Elizabeth. “Urban Refugees in Nairobi: Problems of Protection, Mechanisms  
for Survival, Possibilities for Integration.” Journal of Refugee Studies 19 (2006):  
396-413. 
 
Castles, Stephen “Towards a Sociology of Forced Migration and Social Transformation.”  
Sociology 37 (2003): 13-34. 
 
Chimni, B.S. “From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History  
of Durable Solutions to Refugee Problems.” Refugee Survey Quarterly 23 (2004):  
55-73. 
----------------. “The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South.” Journal of  
Refugee Studies 11 (1998): 350-373.  
 
Crawford, Kate, Martin Suvatne, James Kennedy, and Tom Corsellis. “Urban Shelter and  
the Limits of Humanitarian Action.” Forced Migration Review 34 (2010): 27-28. 
 
Crisp, Jeff. “Refugees, Persons of Concern, and People on the Move: the Broadening  
Boundaries of UNHCR.” Refuge 26 (2010): 73-76. 
-------------. “Surviving the City.” Forced Migration Review 34 (2010) 40-41. 
-------------. “A State of Insecurity: The Political Economy of Violence in Kenya’s  
Refugee Camps.” African Affairs 99 (2000): 601-632. 
 
Crisp, Jeff, Jane Janz, Jose Riera, and Shahira Samy. Surviving the City: a Review of  
UNHCR’s Operation for Iraqi Refugees in Urban Areas of Jordan, Lebanon and  
Syria. Geneva: UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, 2009. 
 
Davies, Anne, and Karen Jacobsen. “Profiling Urban IDPs.” Forced Migration Review 34  
(2010): 13-15. 
97 
 
 
Edwards, Alice. “‘Legitimate’ Protection Spaces: UNHCR’s 2009 Policy.” Forced  
Migration Review 34 (2010): 38-39. 
 
Fabos, Anita and Gaim Kibreab. “Urban Refugees: Introduction.” Refuge 24 (2007): 4- 
10. 
 
Grabska, Katarzyna. “Marginalization in Urban Areas of the Global South: Urban  
Refugees in Cairo.” Journal of Refugee Studies 19 (2006): 287-307. 
-------------------------. Who Asked Them Anyway? Rights, Policies and Well-Being of  
Refugees in Egypt. Brighton: University of Sussex, 2006. 
 
Guterres, Antonio. “Protection Challenges for Persons of Concern in Urban Settings.”  
Forced Migration Review 34 (2010): 8-9. 
 
Harper, Andrew. “Iraq’s Refugees: Ignored and Unwanted.” International Review of the  
Red Cross 90 (2008): 169-190. 
 
Harrell-Bond, Barbara and Guglielmo Verdirame. Rights in Exile: Janus-Faced  
Humanitarianism. Oxford, UK: Berghan Books, 2005. 
 
Harrell-Bond, Barbara and Eftihia Voitura. “In Search of ‘Invisible’ Actors: Barriers to  
Access in Refugee Research.” Journal of Refugee Studies 20 (2007): 281-298. 
 
Hathaway, James. “A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law.”  
Harvard International Law Journal Winter (1990).  
http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-
bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/hilj31&section=13 (accessed September 
2012). 
-----------------------. The Law of Refugee Status. Canada: Butterworths Ltd., 1991. 
 
Hyndman, Jennifer and Bo Viktor Nylund. “UNHCR and the Status of Prima Facie  
Refugees in Kenya.” International Journal of Refugee Law 10 (1998): 21-48. 
 
Hyndman, Jennifer. Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of  
Humanitarianism. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2008. 
 
International Crisis Group. “Failed Responsibility: Iraqi Refugees in Syria, Jordan and  
Lebanon.” Middle East Report 77 (2008).  
www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iraq/077-
failed-responsibility-iraqi-refugees-in-syria-jordan-and-lebanon.aspx (accessed 
October 2012). 
 
Iqbal, Zaryab and Christopher Zorn. “Civil Wars and Refugees in Post-Cold War Africa.”  
Civil Wars 9 (2009): 200-213. 
 
98 
 
Jacobsen, Karen. “Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Urban Areas: a Livelihoods  
Perspective.” Journal of Refugee Studies 19 (2006): 273-286. 
---------------------. The Economic Life of Refugees. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press,  
2005. 
---------------------. “Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to  
Mass Refugee Influxes.” International Migration Review 30 (1996): 655-678. 
---------------------. “Livelihoods in Conflict: The Pursuit of Livelihoods by Refugees and  
the Impact on the Human Security of Host Communities.” International  
Migration 40 (2002): 95-123. 
 
Kagan, Michael. “Frontier Justice: Legal Aid and UNHCR Refugee Status Determination  
in Egypt.” Journal of Refugee Studies 19 (2006): 45-68.  
--------------------. Shared Responsibility in a New Egypt: A Strategy for Refugee  
Protection. Cairo: Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, 2011. 
 
Kagwanja, Peter and Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos. “Refugee Camps or Cities?  
The Socio-Economic Dynamics of the Dadaab and Kakuma Camps in Northeast  
Kenya.” Journal of Refugee Studies 13 (2000): 206-222. 
 
Keeley, Charles. “How Nation-States Create and Respond to Refugee Flows.”  
International Migration Review 30 (1996): 1046-1066.  
--------------------. “The International Refugee Regime(s): The End of the Cold War  
Matters.” International Migration Review 35 (2001): 303-314. 
 
Kibreab, Gaim. “Why Governments Prefer Spatially Segregated Sites for Urban  
Refugees.” Refuge 24 (2007): 27-35. 
-------------------. “Local Settlements in Africa: A Misconceived Option?” Journal of  
Refugee Studies 2 (1989): 468-490. 
 
Le Roch, Karine, et al. “Two Psychosocial Assistance Approaches for Iraqi Urban  
Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon: Center-Based Services Compared to  
Community Outreach Services.” Journal of Muslim Mental Health 5 (2010): 99- 
119. 
 
Luopajarvi, Katja. “Is there an Obligation on States to Accept International Humanitarian  
Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons under International Law?”  
International Journal of Refugee Law 15 (2003): 678-714. 
 
Makhoul, Jihad, and Mary Ghanem. “Displaced Arab Families: Mothers’ Voices on  
Living and Coping in Postwar Beirut.” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 5  
(2009): 54-73. 
 
Mogire, Edward. Victims as Security Threats: Refugee Impact on Host State Security in  
Africa. Ashgate: Farnham Books, 2011. 
 
Pavanello, Sara, and Marzia Montemurro. “Displacement in Urban Areas: Implications  
99 
 
for Humanitarian Action.” Forced Migration Review 34 (2010): 57. 
 
Polzer, Tara, and Laura Hammond. “Invisible Displacement.” Journal of Refugee Studies  
21 (2008): 417-431. 
 
Polzer, Tara. “Invisible Integration: How Bureaucratic, Academic and Social Categories  
Obscure Integrated Refugees.” Journal of Refugee Studies 21 (2008): 476-497.  
 
Qassim, Mohamed, and Paul Speigel. “Forgotten Refugees and Other Displaced  
Populations.” Lancet 362 (2003): 72-73. 
 
Resettlement Legal Aid Project (RLAP). “RLAP Training and Orientation.” Presentation  
to RLAP training session hosted by St. Andrew’s Refugee Services, Cairo, Egypt,  
August 26-30, 2012.  
 
Sadek, Sara. “Iraqi ‘Temporary Guests’ in Neighbouring Countries.” In On the Move:  
Migration Challenges in the Indian Littoral Ocean, edited by Ellen Laipson and  
Amit Pandya, 43-54. Washington, DC: Henry Stimson Centre, 2010. 
 
Sassen, Saskia. “Unsettling Master Categories: Notes on Studying the Global in C.W.  
Mills’ Footsteps.” International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 20  
(2008): 69-83. 
 
Sassoon, Joseph. The Iraqi Refugees: The New Crisis in the Middle East. London, UK:  
I.B. Tauris, 2010. 
 
Scalettaris, Giulia. “Refugees and Mobility.” Forced Migration Review 34 (2010): 58-60. 
 
Speigel, Paul. “Urban Refugee Health: Meeting the Challenges.” Forced Migration  
Review 34 (2010): 22-23. 
 
Sperl, Stefan. Evaluation of UNHCR’s Policy on Refugees in Urban Areas: A Case Study  
Review of Cairo. Geneva: UNHCR, 2001. 
 
Tibaijuka, Anna. “Adapting to Urban Displacement.” Forced Migration Review 34  
(2010): 4. 
 
Veney, Cassandra. “The Politics of Refugee Relief Operations in Kenya.” PhD  
Dissertation, University of Missouri-Columbia, 1995. 
 
Verdirame, Guglielmo. “Human Rights and Refugees: The Case of Kenya.” Journal of  
Refugee Studies 12 (1999): 54-77. 
 
Wahba, Mariham. “The State of Statelessness: Justice, Violence, Subjectivity, and Urban  
Asylum Seeking and Refugee Women in Cairo.” MA Thesis, American  
University in Cairo, 2010. 
100 
 
 
Zetter, Roger, and George Deikum. “Meeting Humanitarian Challenges in Urban Areas.”  
Forced Migration Review 34 (2010): 5-7.  
 
Zetter, Roger. “More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of  
Globalization.” Journal of Refugee Studies 20 (2007): 172-192. 
 
UNHCR. UNHCR Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas. Geneva:  
UNHCR, 2009.  
------------. “Fact Sheet: Lebanon.” (September 2011). www.unhcr.org/4c90812e9.html  
(accessed October 2012). 
------------. “Fact Sheet: Egypt.” (August 2012). www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486356.html  
(accessed October 2012). 
------------. “Urban Refugees.” www.unhcr.org/pages/4b0e4cba6.html (accessed October  
2012). 
-------------. UNHCR Global Trends 2011: A Year of Crises. Geneva: UNHCR, 2012. 
-------------. “2013 UNHCR Country Operations Profile – Egypt.”  
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486356&submit=GO  
(accessed October 2012). 
 
  
 
 
